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ABSTRACT 
 In Syria, reports of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters utilizing small unmanned aerial 
systems (SUAS) to attack U.S. troops and their Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) partners 
became a prevalent tactic. Failing to implement meaningful solutions to detect and 
counter this new application of SUASs by adversaries will cost American lives. The 
purpose of this project is to research and analyze the current capability gap in situational 
awareness technology, specifically focused on the integration of counter-UAS (C-UAS) 
sensors. Using the existing Tactical Assault Kit (TAK) situational awareness tool and 
developmental applications like the Defense Innovation Unit’s Dowding C-UAS System, 
the project explores solutions to these shortfalls by testing software solutions for 
integrating UAS sensors. Through field experiments with Norwegian SOF operators in 
collaboration with DoD partners, this project answers the question, “How can tactical 
situational awareness tools best enhance decision making and survivability of SOF teams 
in a threat UAS environment?” The researchers propose the development of a 
Dowding-based TAK plug-in capable of incorporating data from multiple sensors into a 
single common operating picture and recommends more rigorous, comprehensive testing 
of current C-UAS capabilities. 
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“Sooner or later, everything old is new again,” wrote horror writer Stephen King, 
referring to the human tendency to reuse old concepts and portray them as new.1 With that 
quote in mind, imagine the horror of being an American infantryman on today’s battlefield and 
observing a toy drone that can be purchased at Wal-Mart drop a grenade onto your position. 
The appearance of inexpensive, small unmanned aerial system (SUAS) technology employed 
as an air support platform, combined with a grenade and a little ingenuity, has made an old 
threat new again. Air supremacy theorists would argue that American forces have not had an 
enemy aerial weapon dropped on their positions since Korea.2 Yet, in 2017, reports surfaced 
of Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) fighters using SUAS to attack U.S. troops and their 
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) partners in Syria.3 The U.S. was not the only target of 
modified SUAS as the Russians too became victims of drone attacks in Syria.4 Even unarmed 
SUAS can compromise U.S. movements, positions, and subsequent targeting of enemy forces, 
by using drones as an aerial reconnaissance platform. Failing to implement meaningful controls 
to detect and counter this new application of SUAS by adversaries will cost American lives.  
In an effort to combat this emerging threat, the U.S. military has repurposed many of 
its legacy systems to focus on the SUAS threat, including the Lightweight Counter-Mortar 
Radar (LCMR) and Q-36 Firefinder counterbattery system. Finding these options sub-optimal, 
the Department of Defense is pouring billions of dollars into the research and development of 
counter-UAS (C-UAS) technologies, including $1.5 billion in 2018.5 Compared to the $200 
1 Stephen King, The Colorado Kid (New York: Dorchester Publishing Co., 2005), 45. 
2 Peter Grier, “April 15, 1953,” Air Force Magazine, June, 2011, 55, http://www.airforcemag.com/
MagazineArchive/Documents/2011/June%202011/0611april.pdf 
3 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “ISIS Drones Are Attacking U.S. Troops and Disrupting Airstrikes in Raqqa, 
Officials Say,” Washington Post, June 14, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/
06/14/isis-drones-are-attacking-u-s-troops-and-disrupting-airstrikes-in-raqqa-officials-say. 
4 “Russian Airbase Attacked by Drones in Syria,” CNN, August 16, 2018, video, 1:46, 
https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2018/08/16/drone-attacks-russian-forces-aleppo-syria-pleitgen-lkl-vpx.cnn. 
5 Philip Butterworth-Hayes, “Special Report - U.S. Department of Defense Spending on Counter-UAS 




million spent prior to 2018, the DoD’s massive spending increase acknowledged the 
shortcomings in detection and interdiction of enemy UAS.6  
This increase in spending had enabled C-UAS technological advances to be rapidly 
fielded in an effort to temporarily fill the protection gap. Deployed service members are being 
armed with a multitude of C-UAS technologies aimed at both detection and interdiction of 
enemy UAS. Additionally, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are already equipped with the 
Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK) as their primary situational awareness (SA) tool. Despite 
the effort to enhance protection for service members through equipment fielding, the DoD has 
been unable to seamlessly integrate these disparate C-UAS technologies. For the decentralized 
SOF team operating in an austere environment, many of the C-UAS sensors are neither 
portable nor integrated into an SA tool. Without SA tool integration, independent C-UAS 
sensors do not adequately provide the SOF team with the information required to support 
decision making when faced with an adversary who employs SUAS.  
A. PURPOSE
While there have been significant advances in C-UAS technologies in recent years,
American ground forces remain vulnerable to the effects of enemy SUAS, especially armed 
SUAS. The purpose of this project is to research and analyze the current capability gap in 
situational awareness technology, specifically focused on C-UAS sensor and SA tool 
integration. Using the existing TAK and the Defense Innovation Unit’s (DIU) developmental 
Dowding C-UAS situational awareness tools, the project explores solutions to this shortfall by 
evaluating software applications for existing C-UAS sensors. An integrated SA tool and C-
UAS system would enable ground forces to detect enemy SUAS, alert the team, and provide 
additional situational awareness to higher command elements through a predefined 
communications architecture. Using server-based processing algorithms, this data could then 
be refined and returned to the ground force. This entire process would be completed in near 
real-time and without active inputs from either the team on the ground or their command 




Figure 1. Integrated SA Tool/C-UAS System Concept 
The intended audience is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) Counter 
Improvised Threat Technologies Department, who is responsible for the rapid acquisition of 
material solutions to new and improvised threats, and the U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) G8, who owns the TAK program of record and can prioritize and pursue a 
solution. Many of the available sensors capable of integrating with situational awareness 
systems require additional processing and do not directly integrate with the SA tools. Directly 
networked C-UAS sensors would improve detection and provide limited direction finding of 
threat SUAS at a small cost and high efficiency. The integration of sensors into the TAK 
system would provide improved situational awareness, enabling forces to employ active C-
UAS measures to enhance lethality and to save lives.  
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are to identify, evaluate, and prioritize the factors that 
provide SOF teams, conducting missions while under a C-UAS threat, with the situational 
awareness required to make informed tactical decisions. The study seeks to answer the 
following research question:  
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• How can tactical situational awareness tools enhance decision making and 
survivability of SOF teams in an enemy SUAS-enabled environment? 
And supporting research questions: 
• What factors affect the ATAK user interface (UI) usability in support of C-
UAS situational awareness? 
• What factors affect the Dowding App UI usability in support of C-UAS 
situational awareness? 
This study examines capability gaps and potential utility of select C-UAS sensors, and 
suggests how those sensors could integrate into the ATAK or Dowding C-UAS systems. This 
is accomplished through an iterative series of experiments and software development by DIU, 
culminating in a field test, to evaluate the ATAK and Dowding systems in ground and maritime 
environments. The result is a prioritized list of findings and recommendations for an integrated 
SA tool pursuing the following:  
• Identify end user requirements for dismounted C-UAS sensor integration or 
plug-in application 
• Determine network requirements for supporting the C-UAS SA tool in the 
context of an independently operating and decentralized SOF team 
• Envision how SOF would use the system to increase situational awareness 
and survivability 
C. SCOPE 
This research examines existing commercial off the shelf (COTS) C-UAS technologies 
and how their integration into selected SA tools could enhance the mission command and 
protection capability of SOF units in the contemporary operating environment. For this 
research, the identified threat is low, slow, small (LSS) UAS, specifically commercially 
available drones. Table 1 depicts UAS group characteristics of which groups 1-3 represent LSS 
UAS. The research explores the capabilities and drawbacks of current UAS detection 
5 
technologies, examines the C-UAS capabilities of different SA tools, and identifies the SOF-
specific requirements for SA tools. The experiments use the TAK and the developmental 
Dowding C-UAS system as the primary test mechanisms. These SA tools, integrated with C-
UAS sensors and tactical mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), are field tested in demanding 
environments by small teams of NATO SOF operators, and provide valuable insights and 
recommendations for future development. The research does not address larger UAS, such as 
group 4-5 drones, and focuses exclusively on detection, rather than drone defeat capabilities.  
Table 1. UAS Groups 1 through 57 
Group Weight / Altitude Description 
Group 1 
Micro / Mini 
UAS 
Weighs 20 pounds or less and normally 
operates below 1,200 feet above ground 
level (AGL) at speeds less than 100 knots 
These systems are generally hand launched 
including hobby type UAS. They offer real 
time video and control, and have small payload 
capabilities. Operated within line of sight 
(LOS) of user. 
Group 2 
Small Tactical 
Weighs 21-55 pounds and normally 
operates below 3,500 feet AGL at speeds 
less than 250 knots  
Small airframes, low radar cross-sections, and 
provide medium range and endurance. Requires 
LOS to the ground control station. 
Group 3 
Tactical 
Weighs more than 55 pounds, but less than 
1,320 pounds, and normally operates 
below 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) at 
speeds less than 250 knots 
Range and endurance varies significantly 
among platforms. Requires a larger logistics 
footprint than Groups 1 and 2. 
Group 4 
Persistent 
Weighs more than 1,320 pounds and 
normally operates below 18,000 feet MSL 
at any speed 
Relatively large systems operated at medium to 
high altitudes. This group has extended range 
and endurance capabilities (may require 
runway for launch and recovery) 
Group 5 
Penetrating 
Weighs more than 1,320 pounds and 
normally operates higher than 18,000 feet 
MSL at any speed 
Operated at medium to high altitudes having 
the greatest range, endurance, and airspeed. 
Requires large logistical footprint similar to 
that of manned aircraft. 
 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II reviews the relevant military doctrine, LSS UAS threat, and C-UAS 
technologies. Additionally, Chapter II provides a familiarization with the TAK system, 
previous use, and potential for future development and describes the history and capability 
                                                 
7 Adapted from Department of the Army, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, ATP 3-01.81 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), 1-2, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/
web/ARN3099_ATP%203-01x81%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf. 
6 
of the Dowding C-UAS system. Chapter III documents experiment progress from concept 
through the final field experimentation with Norwegian Special Operations Forces. 
Chapter III focuses on the development of the offline Dowding C-UAS system and the 
TAK’s SkyView-Dowding Integration Application (SDIA) which enabled sensor 
integration. Using the results from Chapter III, Chapter IV analyses the critical factors that 
SOF team requires to enhance decision making in an enemy UAS-threat environment. 
Chapter V provides key conclusions as they relate to the research question, reviews the 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. COUNTER UAS PROTECTION: A COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITY 
The Army’s Mission Command philosophy, found in Army Doctrine Publication 
(ADP) 6-0, outlines the leader’s responsibility to employ both the science of control and 
the art of command of their assigned units.8 While the art of command deals with a leader’s 
responsibility to make sound decisions and provide leadership to his soldiers, the science 
of control includes the establishment and management of systems that improve his 
understanding and support accomplishing missions.9 These control systems comprise not 
only organizational processes and procedures, but the physical networks and information 
systems that enable the commander to lead. In practice, these systems provide the 
commander with the situational awareness and communications capabilities to effectively 
accomplish a given mission.  
Though ADP 6-0 extensively discusses a leader’s responsibility to command and 
control his unit to accomplish its mission, the essence of mission command lies in the 
appropriate delegation of decision-making authority to subordinate leaders.10 The intent 
of this philosophy is to provide military leaders with necessary information and flexibility 
to accomplish their mission. This provides leaders the latitude to seize unexpected 
opportunities and counter threats inherent to the chaotic nature of military operations. By 
“empower [ing] subordinate decision making and decentralized execution,” mission 
command philosophy seeks to maximize the effectiveness of military units and facilitate 
mission accomplishment.11 
                                                 
8 Department of the Army, Mission Command, ADP 6-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 
2019), 2-1, 3-1, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19189_ADP_6-
0_FINAL_WEB_v2.pdf. 
9 Department of the Army, 2-1, 3-1. 
10 Department of the Army, 1-5. 
11 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
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1. Counter-UAS Doctrine 
In addition to mission command, Army doctrine requires commanders to protect 
their troops. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37, Protection, states that the commander 
maintains an “inherent responsibility to protect and preserve the force and secure the area 
of operations (AO) [which] is vital in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.”12 
The commander accomplishes this by following the five Protection Principles: 
Comprehensive, Integrated, Layered, Redundant, and Enduring.13 While this concept 
applies broadly to the protection of U.S. forces writ-large, the Army C-UAS manual, Army 
Technique Publication (ATP) 3-01.81, addresses the commander’s duty to protect U.S. 
forces through the detection and defeat of LSS drones by tactical level units.14 
ATP 3-01.81 provides a comprehensive methodology for training, development, 
and implementation of C-UAS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). In addition to 
describing planning considerations and techniques for defending against unconventional 
air threats, the manual emphasizes the importance of integrating sensors and sharing 
intelligence between echelons.15 Drawing from the Protection Principles, the doctrine 
directs the development of integrated sensor, collection, and dissemination plans to 
establish a common operating picture (COP) for the commander.16 The sensor plan 
incorporates available sensors, including radar, acoustic, and radio frequency devices, to 
provide comprehensive and layered detection, while the collection plan allocates assets to 
ensure enduring coverage. The dissemination plan also provides leaders with a consistent 
understanding of their operational environment, allowing them to make appropriate 
decisions. 
                                                 
12 Department of the Army, Protection, ADP 3-37 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 
1-3, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18685_ADP%203-
37%20FINAL%20WEB_v2.pdf. 
13 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
14 Department of the Army, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, 1-1. 
15 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
16 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
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2. Mission Command and Special Operations 
The concept of mission command is especially important in the SOF community 
and is exemplified in the U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) vision 
statement: “Empowered SOF Professionals, globally networked, partnered and integrated, 
relentlessly seeking advantage in every domain to compete and win for the Joint Force and 
the Nation.”17 This concept is further underscored in the Special Operations Forces 
Operating Concept (SOF-OC), published in 2016.18 The SOF-OC seeks to improve the 
future of U.S. SOF by providing an actionable framework that ensures readiness and 
capabilities of USSOCOM. This document emphasizes the importance of agile and flexible 
SOF operators and leaders that are empowered to think, act, and operate in complex and 
uncertain environments as “the risk of not acting, or acting late, can dramatically alter the 
world landscape, eroding the Nation’s security, influence and standing.”19  
The expectations outlined in SOF-OC and USSOCOM’s mission statement 
highlight the need for SOF units to act quickly and without direct oversight, but also 
without accepting undue risk.20 This decentralized operational construct and the relative 
size of SOF units make them difficult to protect. SOF units generally operate with much 
smaller logistical and defensive footprints than their conventional counterparts and thus 
rely on specialized training and technological capabilities to enhance their survivability. 
DoD C-UAS and situational awareness technology must outpace the threats from our 
enemies, or U.S. SOF operators will continue to be vulnerable in contemporary operating 
environments. 
                                                 
17 “About USSOCOM: Mission Statement and Vision,” U.S. Special Operations Command, June 12, 
2019, https://www.socom.mil/about. 
18 Joseph Votel, Special Operations Forces Operating Concept: A Whitepaper to Guide Future SOF 
Development (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2016), https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/SOF-Operating-Concept-v1-0_020116-Final.pdf. 
19 Votel. 
20 U.S. Special Operations Command, “About USSOCOM: Mission Statement and Vision”; Votel, 
Special Operations Forces Operating Concept. 
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B. CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES 
In his 2019 testimony on the posture of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 
General Joe Votel discussed the importance of technology and organizations like the Joint 
Improvised Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) in combatting the most dangerous threats 
to U.S. forces.21 Votel specifically commented that CENTCOM relies heavily on critical 
emerging technologies to counter weaponized UAS that both threaten the safety of U.S. 
and allied forces and undermine the mission in the area of responsibility.22 General Tony 
Thomas, commander of USSOCOM, echoed the importance of technology in his testimony 
two-weeks later.23 While General Votel noted the use of technological advances to counter 
threats, General Thomas’ remarks were directed at the use of technology to enable SOF to 
remain nimble and empower leaders in their execution of mission command. Based on 
these comments, it is clear that available and emerging technologies in the mission 
command and C-UAS realm are critical to military success in the contemporary and future 
operating environments. 
1. Mission Command Technology and the Tactical Assault Kit 
The Tactical Assault Kit (TAK) is a family of tools used on Android, Windows, 
and web-based systems.24 Special Operations Forces primarily employ the Android TAK 
(ATAK), an Android phone-based end user device (EUD) which provides a common 
operating picture using overlaid Global Positioning System (GPS) information and 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) map data.25 TAK uses an intuitive 
graphic user interface (GUI) to allow its users to quickly and simply operate various tools 
to enhance situational awareness and accomplish specific tasks. The flexibility of the TAK 
                                                 
21 Posture Statement of the U.S. Central Command and the Current and Future Challenges in the 
Middle East: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of 
Joseph Votel, Commander, U.S. Central Command).  
22 Votel, testimony on U.S. Central Command and the Current and Future Challenges. 
23 Posture Statement of the U.S. Special Operations Command: Testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Raymond Thomas, Commander, U.S. Special 
Operations Command).  
24 “What is TAK?,” Tactical Assault Kit, accessed February 7, 2019. https://takmaps.com. 
25 Tactical Assault Kit.  
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system gives users the capability to create and upload applications and plug-ins that 
perform general functions such as identifying the locations of other TAK users, and task-
specific functions like military freefall planning suites, counter weapons of mass 
destruction sensors, and precision runway survey tools. Most importantly, the TAK 
platform brings together these disparate planning and situational awareness functions on a 
single device, while enabling all connected users to share a COP.  
The TAK system allows users to share information, like the locations of friendly or 
enemy elements, by passing cursor-on-target (CoT) data between devices. CoT data is data 
protocol designed to allow tactical systems to quickly communicate critical information 
between devices and is the primary language used by the TAK.26 Users pass this message 
traffic by pairing TAK enabled devices to specifically designed mesh network radio nodes, 
such as the Persistent System Wave Relay radios, or by connecting devices to a central 
computer processor specifically designed to route CoT data messages called a TAK 
Server.27 
While the Android-specific ATAK is the most commonly used configuration of the 
TAK system, the program is also designed to work on Windows (WinTAK), in a Virtual 
Reality planner (VTAK), and a government civilian version (TAK-Civ). Additionally, 
recent research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School led to the development of the 
Joint Operations Center TAK (JOCTAK).28 Recognizing the inability of an Android-based 
platform to provide adequate processing power and display outputs for an operations 
center, the JOCTAK construct sought to bring the tactical utility and flexibility of the 
ATAK system to the operational headquarters.29 By creating an operational-level system 
that integrates directly with the proven ATAK system, the developers effectively bridged 
26 Michael J. Kristan et al., Cursor-on-Target Message Router User’s Guide, Report Number 
MP090284 (Bedford, MA: MITRE Corporation, 2009), 2-1, https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA640597. 
27 “MPU5: The World’s First Smart Radio,” Persistent Systems, 2017, 
https://www.persistentsystems.com/site/wp-content/themes/persistensystems/pdf/mpu5/
mpu5_spec_sheet.pdf; Tactical Assault Kit, “What is the TAK?” 
28 Daniel Bandy et al., “JOKTAK: Joint Operations Center Tactical Assault Kit” (Defense Analysis 
poster, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58015. 
29 Bandy et al., 4. 
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the information and situational awareness gaps between decentralized ground units and 
their command headquarters.  
The TAK’s flexibility and functionality allow commanders and operators to 
communicate provided that users are networked. The TAK is not restricted to a 
standardized network configuration and operates across both open and closed networks. 
Acknowledging that capability, certain network configurations are preferred for specific 
mission sets. Radio advancement, especially software defined radio technologies, provides 
users the ability to communicate larger volumes of data in addition to voice 
transmissions.30 This increase in communications capability allows users to send and 
receive data streams while conducting decentralized operations. The TAK, operating over 
a wireless communication network, meets the operator’s demand for consistent 
connectivity between teams and higher headquarters.  
Two types of wireless communication networks exist: infrastructure-based and ad 
hoc.31 Figure 2 depicts the differences between infrastructure-based and ad hoc networks. 
Infrastructure-based networks use centralized hardware to connect wireless networks, 
through a wireless access point (WAP), to wired networks, through a switch.32 Users 
operating on infrastructure-based networks are reliant on the WAP and switch to access 
data residing on wired networks. A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a “peer-to-peer, 
multihop connected network [that] is composed usually of tens to hundreds of mobile 
nodes.”33 A MANET is “used to connect wireless clients directly together, without the 
need for a wireless access point or a connection to an existing wired network.”34 In a 
MANET, “each individual node must be able to act both as a host, which generates user 
30 Jon Harper, “Military, Industry Gung-Ho on Software Defined Radios,” National Defense, February 
15, 2019, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/2/15/military-industry-gung-ho-on-
software-defined-radios. 
31 Jonathan Loo, Jaime Lloret Mauri, and Jesus Hamilton Ortiz, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Current 
Status and Future Trends (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 2012), 4. 
32 Loo, Mauri, and Ortiz, 4. 
33 Doina Bein, “Self-Configuring, Self-Organizing, and Self-Healing Schemes in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks,” in Guide to Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, ed. Sudip Misra, Isaac Woungang, and Subhas Misra 
(London: Springer Science and Business Media, 2009), 27. 
34 Loo, Mauri, and Ortiz, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, 4. 
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and application traffic, and as a router.”35 In a military application, the primary advantage 
of the MANET is the ability for hosts to “remain connected while they are moving around” 
by freeing users from a central WAP, which facilitate inter-team communication even if 
connectivity is lost with higher headquarters.36 When infrastructure-based and MANETs 
are linked together, decentralized teams and higher headquarters form larger, more resilient 
networks. Combining the advantages of wireless and wired networks, commanders have 
access to the full suite of TAK infrastructure capabilities. 
 
Figure 2. Infrastructure and Mobile Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 
Most importantly, ATAK facilitates the mission command concept of delegated 
authority. In a qualitative leap beyond traditional radio communication technologies, 
ATAK empowers subordinate commanders with near real-time situational awareness. This 
                                                 
35 Doina Bein, “Self-Configuring, Self-Organizing, and Self-Healing Schemes in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks,” 27. 
36 Loo, Mauri, and Ortiz, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, 5. 
Infrastructure-based Wireless Network Mobile Ad Hoc Wireless Network
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vast improvement in understanding and awareness allows leaders at all levels to make 
faster, more informed decisions. 
2. Current Uses 
Prior TAK-focused research and development projects addressed various capability 
gaps including the lack of integrated mission planning tools, the policy preventing SOF 
teams from physically accompanying host nation partners, the creation of an operational 
level TAK system, and the integration of sensors to detect Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) threats and countering weapons of mass destruction 
(CWMD). These projects evolved from the Remote Advise and Assist (RAA) kit into the 
Advanced Digital Adviser Partnering Technologies (ADAPT) which created the 
Collaborative Mission Planner (CMP) and later branched into the JOCTAK.37 The RAA 
kit connects Special Forces advisors to their partner forces through the integration of 
multiple technologies including geospatial software and satellite communication 
hardware.38 As seen in Figure 3, the CMP integrates mission planning features into the 
TAK to better share understanding and remove the requirement to build separate planning 
products.39 The JOCTAK system unifies all TAK systems and provides a common 
operational picture to each user by amalgamating and redistributing information.40 The 
JOCTAK system uses the RAA concept to integrate CBRN sensors to allow commanders 
to more rapidly adjudicate fissile material detection and identification, and enables them to 
efficiently allocate resources while conducting the CWMD mission.41 As USSOCOM’s 
choice tool to support mission command, the TAK allows for the integration of emerging 
technologies within a flexible software application. 
                                                 
37 Bandy et al., “Joint Operations Center Tactical Assault Kit (JOCTAK),” 27-28. 
38 Christopher Thielenhaus and Eric Roles, “Maximizing the Utility of Special Warfare: The Remote 
Advise and Assist Concept” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 53-54. 
39 Michael Ferriter, Phil Schupp, and Sverre Wetteland, “Organizing Chaos: The Tactical Assault Kit 
Collaborative Mission Planner” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 16, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56915. 
40 Bandy et al., “Joint Operations Center Tactical Assault Kit (JOCTAK),” 4. 
41 Bandy et al., 4-5. 
15 
 
Figure 3. TAK Collaborative Mission Planner Concept42 
3. Threat UAS Technologies 
To counter their inferior resources and technological capabilities, militant groups 
have long pursued innovative methods to inflict harm on state militaries. In the 
contemporary operating environment, groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban have 
consistently used unconventional tactics like suicide bombers and improvised explosive 
devices (IED), to seek parity in their unbalanced war against the United States and the 
West. As the U.S. military adapted to these TTPs, these tactics became less effective 
against military forces, driving militants to expand their search for an inexpensive weapon 
capable of harming U.S. forces; they found their weapon in COTS LSS UAS.43  
While the use of UAS by non-state actors is not necessarily a new concept—Hamas 
has used Iran-provided drones since at least 2004—the proliferation of commercial-use 
                                                 
42 Ferriter, Schupp, and Wetteland, “Organizing Chaos,” 16. 
43 Don Rassler, “Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones and Supportive Technology,” 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 20, 2016, 11, https://ctc.usma.edu/remotely-piloted-
innovation-terrorism-drones-and-supportive-technology. 
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drones presents a novel threat.44 Violent extremist organizations (VEO), use numerous 
types of LSS UAS including commercially available multi-copters, larger fixed-wing 
platforms, and even completely homemade aircraft.45 These organizations use their UAS 
predominantly in three ways: as a reconnaissance and surveillance asset, as a fires platform, 
and to film attacks for propaganda purposes.46 
The Islamic State’s drone program was first reported in August 2014.47 Though 
initially used merely to generate propaganda and provide situational awareness to leaders, 
ISIS began weaponizing commercial drones by summer 2016.48 While the earliest models 
of armed drones were nothing more than unmanned vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
devices (VBIED), by December 2016, ISIS drones were capable of dropping grenade-sized 
munitions on unsuspecting soldiers and bases with relative precision.49 While aerial fires 
are currently the predominant threat posed to U.S. forces by SUAS, technological advances 
may prove to be far more dangerous. 
Though the current UAS threat is real, emerging threats of autonomous swarm 
technology and aerial dispersion of chemical and biological agents are potentially the most 
                                                 
44 Alyssa Sims, “The Rising Drone Threat from Terrorists,” Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs 19, no. 1 (2018): 97-107, https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2018.0012. 
45 Dan Gettinger, “Drones Operating in Syria and Iraq” Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard 
College (blog), December 2016, 1-2, https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2016/12/Drones-in-Iraq-and-Syria-
CSD.pdf.  
46 Asaad Almohammad and Anne Speckhard, “ISIS Drones: Evolution, Leadership, Bases, Operations 
and Logistics,” International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (blog), May 2017, 2-3, 
http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/isis-drones-evolution-leadership-bases-operations-and-logistics. 
47 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Islamic State Militants in Syria Now Have Drone Capabilities,” National 
Defense, August 28, 2014, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2014/8/28/islamic-state-
militants-in-syria-now-have-drone-capabilities. 
48 Almohammad and Speckhard, “ISIS Drones,” 2-3. 
49 Steven Stalinsky and R. Sosnow, “A Decade of Jihadi Organizations’ Use of Drones - From Early 
Experiments by Hizbullah, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda to Emerging National Security Crisis for the West as 
ISIS Launches First Attack Drones,” Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis 1300 
(February 21, 2017), https://www.memri.org/reports/decade-jihadi-organizations-use-drones-
%E2%80%93-early-experiments-hizbullah-hamas-and-al-qaeda. 
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concerning future threat for the U.S. military.50 Using commercially available technology 
meant for crop-spraying, VEOs can develop mobile, dispersal platforms for chemical and 
biological weapons.51 The use of chemical weapons is already a prevalent threat in Syria, 
with over 300 confirmed uses during the Syrian Civil War (2012-2018).52 The potential 
for SUAS to be used as a method of dispersion only exacerbates this threat to American 
forces in the region. While the use of this tactic has not been reported, this technology is 
widely available and VEOs could easily employ this capability. 
While not currently as technologically obtainable as aerial dispersion, autonomous 
swarm technology has the greatest potential to devastate the current U.S. drone defenses. 
Autonomous swarms are networked groups of unmanned systems programmed to 
accomplish specific tasks without human input.53 When this technology is applied to 
SUAS, the drones are capable of identifying targets, conducting precision attacks, 
intelligently defeating countermeasures, and overwhelming air defense systems.54 Because 
of their autonomous nature, groups of intelligent swarms can also be used to conduct 
extremely complex attacks without endangering the operator or other militants on the 
ground. 
While the threat of militant UAS use is consistently changing, Don Rassler from 
the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point sums up the current state of the threat 
perfectly: 
                                                 
50 Irving Lachow, “The Upside and Downside of Swarming Drones,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
73, no. 2 (2017): 96-98, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1290879; Ahmet S. Yayla and Anne 
Speckhard, “The Potential Threats Posed by ISIS’s Use of Weaponized Air Drones and How to Fight 
Back,” International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (blog), March 1, 2017, 
https://www.icsve.org/the-potential-threats-posed-by-isiss-use-of-weaponized-air-drones-and-how-to-fight-
back. 
51 Yayla and Speckhard, “The Potential Threats Posed by ISIS’s Use of Weaponized Air Drones and 
How to Fight Back.” 
52 Tobias Schneider and Theresa Lutkefend, “Nowhere to Hide: The Logic of Chemical Weapon Use 
in Syria,” Global Public Policy Institute Study (blog), February 2019, https://www.gppi.net/media/
GPPi_Schneider_Luetkefend_2019_Nowhere_to_Hide_Web.pdf. 
53 M. Rubenstein, C. Ahler, and R. Nagpal, “Kilobot: A Low Cost Scalable Robot System for 
Collective Behaviors,” in IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (2012), 3293-98, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICRA.2012.6224638. 
54 Don Rassler, “Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones and Supportive Technology,” 50-
54. 
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Currently, the use of a single UAS by terrorists piloted by remote control 
remains a “niche” threat and is best understood as being a moderate 
probability, and low-to-moderate threat in terms of lethality. While the use 
of a group of drones, or an autonomous swarm, by terrorist entities has not 
yet been observed, the use of more and more sophisticated drones is likely 
to enhance the scope and seriousness of the threat, and affect the 
consequence of future incidents.55 
4. C-UAS Technologies 
SOF units require C-UAS capabilities that are as versatile and agile as their own 
formations. As such, they require detection capabilities that are portable, require little 
power, and can be maintained in austere environments. 
Counter-UAS (C-UAS) technology generally falls into one of two categories: 
detection and interdiction. The current detection mechanisms predominantly use one or 
more of three sensor technologies to identify and track UAS: acoustic, radio frequency 
(RF), and radar.56 In the UAS detection realm, no single sensor, or even sensor type, is the 
panacea; when considering their size, cost, and effectiveness, each has a distinct 
weakness.57 Table 2 depicts the advantages and disadvantages of acoustic, RF, and radar 
C-UAS sensors. While the strengths and weaknesses of sensors vary across the spectrum 
of technologies, one weakness remains consistent: they have not been appropriately 
integrated with situational awareness tools, and most do not communicate with each other. 
                                                 
55 Rassler, 63 
56 J.R. Wilson, “The New World of Counter-Drone Technology,” Military and Aerospace Electronics, 




Table 2. Advantages and Disadvantages of C-UAS Sensor Types58 
Type of Sensor Advantages Disadvantages 
Acoustic Sound emission detection 









Target Ground Control Station 
Ability to classify target 







Drone waypoint mode 







Ability to classify target 
Power consumption 
Size and weight 
Detection angle 
 
a. Acoustic Detection 
As the name suggests, acoustic detection devices listen for the sounds produced by 
the rotors or engine of an UAS. Specifically, “acoustic sensing is a passive technology that 
involves the detection of acoustic wave energy produced by some oscillating body.”59 
Microphones “detect pressure fluctuations created during wave transmission” and are 
designed for omnidirectional detection.60 Sensors capable of omnidirectional detection of 
faint noises have their obvious benefits when compared against other types of C-UAS sensors. 
                                                 
58 Adapted from Sai Ram Ganti and Yoohwan Kim, “Implementation of Detection and Tracking 
Mechanism for Small UAS,” in International Conference on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (2016), 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICUAS.2016.7502513; Ismail Guvenc et al., “Detection, Localization, and Tracking of 
Unauthorized UAS and Jammers,” in IEEE/AIAA 36th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (September 2017), 
6, https://doi.org/10.1109/DASC.2017.8102043; P. Poitevin, M. Pelletier, and P. Lamontagne, “Challenges in 
Detecting UAS with Radar,” in International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (2017), 1, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/CCST.2017.8167852; “Giraffe 1X Short Range 3D Radar,” Saab Solutions, accessed 
June 18, 2019, https://saab.com/air/sensor-systems/ground-based-air-defence/giraffe-1x. 
59 Brendan Harvey and Siu O’Young, “Acoustic Detection of a Fixed-Wing UAV,” Drones 2, no. 1 
(2018): 1, https://doi.org/10.3390/drones2010004. 
60 Harvey and O’Young, 1. 
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Microphones can also be built from micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS). MEMS are 
“structures or mechanisms with one or more geometrical dimension on the order of one to 
hundreds of micrometers in size and comprise small electro-mechanical systems that are 
produced utilizing microfabrication techniques.”61 MEMS technology is not specific to 
acoustic sensors or defense applications and can be used across a broad spectrum of 
disciplines ranging from biology to inertial sensing.62 MEMS acoustic sensors provide the 
added benefit of being both small and lightweight which reduce the dismounted operator’s 
weight and power requirements. However, MEMS acoustic sensors are difficult to ruggedize 
and are adversely affected by weather, moisture, and dust.63  
Researchers and students at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Consortium for Robotics 
and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER) are developing MEMS acoustic 
sensors directed at collecting and studying UAS acoustic signatures.64 The research effort is 
based on the replication of the mechanically coupled ears of the Ormia ochracea fly in a 
narrowband MEMS direction finding sensor.65 Still in the development phase, the MEMS 
acoustic directional sensors use spectral characteristics to detect motion with a single 
sensor.66 The goal for the MEMS acoustic directional sensors is to remove ambient sound 
clutter and have the capability to be tuned to detect specific UAS harmonics.67  
                                                 
61 Daniel Hogue and Sarah Gregory, “MEMS-Based Waste Vibrational Energy Harvesters” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 3. https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/34678. 
62 “MEMS and Nanotechnology Applications.” MEMS Exchange, accessed February 8, 2019. 
https://www.mems-exchange.org/MEMS/applications.html. 
63 Squarehead Technology, “Squarehead Unveils Discovair G2,” Squarehead News (blog), August 3, 
2018, https://www.sqhead.com/squarehead-unveils-discovair-g2. 
64 Fabio Alves and Gamani Karunasiri, “MEMS Acoustic Directional Finder for Small Flying UAS” 
(CRUSER’s TechCon, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/58040. 
65 Daniel Wilmott, Fabio Alves, and Gamani Karunasiri, “Bio-Inspired Miniature Directional Finding 
Acoustic Sensor,” Nature Scientific Reports 6, 29957 (2016), 1. https://www.nature.com/articles/srep29957. 
66 Fabio Alves and Gamani Karunasiri, “MEMS Acoustic Directional Finder for Small Flying UAS.” 
67 Todd Coursey, “MEMS Acoustic Sensor for Drone Detection” (presentation, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, April 11, 2017), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/53349. 
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Acoustic sensors are limited by the existence of wind and environmental noise which 
clutters the sensors’ ability to detect unique sounds from the UAS.68 Environmental noises 
range from persistent city noise to battlefield sounds such as gunfire and artillery. The effects 
can overwhelm the acoustic sensors and make them ineffective. An industry-leading example 
of an acoustic C-UAS sensor is the Discovair G2 developed by the Norwegian company, 
Squarehead Technologies. Squarehead has developed a ruggedized acoustic sensor consisting 
of 128 MEMS microphones capable of detecting and tracking UAS in an effort to make 
acoustic C-UAS sensors viable.69 The Discovair G2 was built specifically to operate in 
austere environments and was purposely built with a robust application program interface 
(API) for integration with situational awareness tools.70 Figure 4 shows a scientist from 
Squarehead operating the Discovair G2 with the authors in Norway.  
 
Figure 4. Squarehead Discovair G2 
                                                 
68 G. J. Mendis et al., “Deep Learning Based Doppler Radar for Micro UAS Detection and 
Classification,” in IEEE Military Communications Conference (2016), 1, https://doi.org/10.1109/
MILCOM.2016.7795448. 
69 “Discovair: Acoustic Drone Detection,” Squarehead Technology, October 2018, 
https://www.sqhead.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Drone-Detection-Discovair-G2-brochure.pdf. 
70 Squarehead Technology, “Discovair: Acoustic Drone Detection.” 
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b. Radio Frequency Detection 
Radio Frequency sensor technologies provide a dependable, long-range C-UAS 
detection capability.71 The SUAS and the associated ground control station (GCS) 
communicate with each other through radio wave transmissions. Generally, SUAS use Wi-
Fi, transmitted over 2.4 gigahertz Ultra High Frequency (UHF) waves, to communicate 
between the airframe and the GCS.72 A GCS can use a flight controller, smartphone, or tablet 
to communicate with the SUAS via Wi-Fi.73 Radio frequencies also transmit between 
onboard cameras or other payloads to the GCS.74 These frequency emissions can be exploited 
by RF sensor technology and used to locate the SUAS and GCS. Another advantage of RF 
sensors is their size and weight which allows for dismounted and mounted configurations, as 
depicted in Figure 5.  
Radio frequency C-UAS technology broadly applies to the sensing, detecting, and 
jamming of devices, and is sub-divided into passive and active collection. Passive collection 
sensors detect signals transmitted between the SUAS and the GCS while active sensors emit 
radio frequencies which reflect off the SUAS and return to the receiver.75 Although passive 
RF collection is dependable, it is not without limitations. SUAS flying to preset waypoints do 
not necessarily transmit signals back to the ground control station when flying autonomously. 
The waypoint mode technology allows enemy SUAS operators to preprogram missions into 
the SUAS before launching, which allows operation without an RF signature.76 Another 
weakness of passive collection is the requirement for RF-based C-UAS sensor operators to 
maintain an updated load set for the various frequencies that each unique SUAS transmits. A 
                                                 
71 Ganti and Kim, “Implementation of Detection and Tracking Mechanism for Small UAS,” 1255. 
72 John Patrick Pullen, “This Is How Drones Work,” Time, April 3, 2015, https://time.com/3769831/
this-is-how-drones-work. 
73 Pullen. 
74 Guvenc et al., “Detection, Localization, and Tracking of Unauthorized UAS and Jammers,” 6. 
75 Phuc Nguyen et al., “Investigating Cost-Effective RF-Based Detection of Drones,” in Proceedings 
of the 2nd Workshop on Micro Aerial Vehicle Networks, Systems, and Applications for Civilian Use (2016), 
18, https://doi.org/10.1145/2935620.2935632. 
76 H. Fu et al., “Low-Complexity Portable Passive Drone Surveillance via SDR-Based Signal 
Processing,” IEEE Communications Magazine 56, no. 4 (April 2018), 115, https://doi.org/10.1109/
MCOM.2018.1700424. 
23 
load set is a library of frequencies the SUAS and GCS transmit, which must be programmed 
into the RF sensor for the C-UAS device to properly detect, catalogue, and jam. Personnel 
with ground experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria will recognize this process as being 
similar to the load sets filled into the Counter Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive 
Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) systems. If the correct load set is not filled into the C-
UAS sensor, neither the aircraft nor the GCS can be detected. 
 
Figure 5. SkyView RF Sensor in Dismounted and Vessel Mounted 
Configurations 
c. Radar 
Unlike RF, which detects signals being sent between an aircraft and its GCS, radar 
detects the target itself. Radar stands for Radio Detection and Ranging, and in simplified 
terms, radar detects targets by sending out a pulse which reflects off a target’s cross-section 
and returns back through propagation.77 This process results in five primary radar 
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observables: target range, target angles (including azimuth and elevation), target size (also 
known as radar cross-section), target speed, and target features.78 Using the Doppler effect, 
radar can distinguish between moving and static objects and determine speed.79 Speed data, 
combined with range and angle measurements, allow the radar to locate targets. 
In 2015, radar research, focused on the detection and classification of LSS UAS, 
barely existed.80 However, in the few years since ISIS began using LSS UAS on the 
battlefield, the demand for layered C-UAS detection systems spurred the scientific 
community to make significant developments using radar. The benefits of radar detection 
include ranged detection of moving or static objects, all-weather capability, night and day use, 
and 360-degree coverage.81 The disadvantages of radar include the difficulties associated 
with detection of targets with small radar cross-section (RCS), low speeds, and low 
altitudes.82 A major gap currently being overcome is the inability for radar systems to classify 
and discriminate between detections. To target LSS UAS, a radar’s detection threshold must 
decrease which also results in the detection of birds and other small flying objects.83 Despite 
this limitation, radar’s shown potential for detecting UAS combined with the increased UAS 
threat has driven radar producers to optimize radars specifically for UAS detection. 
Tradeoffs exist between the intended purpose of a radar, its cost, physical size, and 
alternative utilizations.84 For example, a radar whose primary purpose is to detect next 
generation fighter jets is optimized for that purpose. Although that system will be able to 
detect Group 4 and 5 UAS, it will perform poorly against LSS UAS due to optimization 
considerations such as algorithms used, frequencies, and bandwidth. Rotating radars provide 
360-degree coverage, a crucial element for detecting enemy LSS UAS deployed from any 
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direction. Radar’s advantages make it an important sensor in layered C-UAS detection; 
however, the LSS UAS poses a unique challenge which requires an adaptation away from 
conventional radar use.  
The inherent characteristics of LSS UAS challenge conventional radar systems due to 
the low altitude flight, slow speeds, and small RCS.85 Although radars conduct 360-degree 
detection, radar is limited to a range of elevation coverage.86 The idiom “flying under the 
radar” absolutely applies to LSS UAS as a radar gauged for a high-altitude threat will be 
unable to detect low flying UAS. Ground moving-target indication (GMTI) radars use specific 
target speed thresholds, called Minimum Detectable Velocity (MDV), to allow the sensor to 
distinguish the target from the ground.87 The low speeds of LSS UAS are inseparable from 
clutter, and the LSS UAS evades detection.88 To detect LSS UAS by radar, the Signal to 
Noise Ratio (SNR) must reach a point where the radar detects a weak signal and distinguishes 
it from surrounding noise.89 The minimal radar cross-section produced by LSS UAS 
complicates detection as the small target does not allow for radar signals to reflect back 
towards the radar receiver.90 To mitigate the challenges of a small RCS, higher frequency 
radars can be used, as the cross-section is proportional to frequency.91  
Principal C-UAS detection research and testing has focused on a wide array of radar 
technologies to address the low RCS issue. In 2018, researchers at the Universidad Politécnica 
de Madrid devised an X-band frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) radar to detect 
a DJI Phantom-4 drone at a range up to two kilometers.92 Research by Guvenc et al., from 
2017 points to the viability of Extremely High Frequency (EHF) mmWave radar drone 
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detection.93 Using mmWave radar, Guvenc detected a DJI Phantom 2 and a DJI S1000 at 
ranges between 30 to 90 meters.94 Three-dimensional (3D) X-band radar, like Saab’s Giraffe 
1X, provides 360-degree coverage and the capability to identify drone elevation in a package 
capable of mounting on a light vehicle.95 Even the most compact radars, such as the Giraffe 
1X seen in Figure 6, weigh over 600 lbs, which prevents dismounted forces from employing 
the radar. At this time, the size and the weight of radar does not provide enough of a reasonable 
advantage to change doctrine, equipment, and TTPs when compared against the LSS UAS 
threat.  
 
Figure 6. Saab Giraffe 1X Radar96 
The literature points to radar’s challenges with classification and discrimination of 
target type but also to opportunities.97 While technical issues persist, the professional debate 
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also highlights the significant developments made in radar technology since 2015. Another 
issue not discussed in the literature is the size and weight disadvantage. For base defense, the 
3D radar solution could immediately be used at remote SOF bases. For SOF employment, 
systems like the Giraffe 1X can mount on the Ground Mobility Vehicles (GMV) or on SOF 
non-tactical vehicles (NTV); however, commanders must account for the size to weight ratio 
and its physical signature. Although radar continues to be miniaturized and man-packable 
systems exist, the current systems optimized for LSS UAS detection are not man-packable.  
C. C-UAS SENSOR INTEGRATION AND TAK 
The integration of UAS detection devices with situational awareness tools such as the 
TAK could enhance survivability for troops on the ground through improved detection and 
fusion targeting enemy SUAS. A SUAS sensor, connected using either a specialized TAK 
Server or MANET designed for CoT transport, would provide location information to all 
networked devices. 
At this point, most sensor to ATAK integration is left to the sensor companies, rather 
than at the central ATAK program office. Often these plug-ins are developed on a single 
version of the ATAK firmware and, as such, many vendor-based plug-ins are not compatible 
with all versions of ATAK.98 This presents a significant problem when trying to use multiple 
sensors on the same ATAK network.  
To solve this problem, several organizations, including the Asymmetric Warfare 
Group (AWG), Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), and the Army Combat Capabilities Develop 
Command (CCDC), have developed solutions to mass-integrate disparate sensors. Each of 
these organizations uses a different approach to solving the problem, and each system has 
distinct strengths and weaknesses.  
                                                 
98 Charlie Johnson and Brandon Dodd, personal communication, April 30, 2019. 
28 
1. Asymmetric Warfare Group’s Defense-in-Depth Exercise 
In November 2018, AWG conducted a large-scale experiment to test 15 unique 
counter-UAS devices and to integrate them into the TAK environment.99 Because many of 
the sensors did not have a functioning ATAK plug-in, the experimenters used ingest protocols 
in a TAK server to create CoT data to distribute to the ATAK devices. Because this solution 
used unspecific protocols, the server would often produce a CoT for identified false positives. 
As a result, ATAK users were often overwhelmed with a COP containing icons that were 
either not UAS (false positives) or multiple icons for the same UAS threat (redundant 
reporting).100 By maximizing the number of C-UAS technologies, the experiment sacrificed 
precision; this issue is an important factor that has not been solved and critical for future 
research to explore. 
The AWG conducted Defense-in-Depth Exercise (DiDEX) 2018 at Fort A.P. Hill, VA 
in November 2018 and brought together multiple C-UAS system vendors and conventional 
Army forces to explore “best practices for employing multiple C-UAS capabilities against a 
LSS UAS threat.”101 The DiDEX experiments arrayed the 15 C-UAS technologies in depth 
and employed conventional forces at a Battalion Command and Control (C2) node, Company 
C2 node, and in mobile elements.102 While DiDEX included both the detect and defeat 
capabilities of the C-UAS construct, it was not scoped to focus on the nuanced requirements 
of detecting, tracking, and classifying SUAS or how to best present this data using SA tools. 
Additionally, the experiment did not account for the specific needs of a dismounted SOF team 
operating in a decentralized environment. 
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2. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command’s FOCUS 
The Army CCDC solution to C-UAS sensor integration is the in-development, 
vehicle-based integration system FOCUS. The FOCUS system uses a Sensor Interface 
Module (SIM) that ingests specific sensor feeds using a TAK server.103 Unlike the TAK 
server used in the DiDEX experiment, the FOCUS system has optimized protocols and fusion 
algorithms for six specific sensors in order to maximize the efficiency of the system. This 
framework sacrifices broad applicability for precision and accuracy. 
The sensors identified for FOCUS integration are the L3 Coppola Light (EO/IR), 
Squarehead Discovair G2 (acoustic), Verus SkyView (RF), U.S. Army Darkbridge (RF), 
AFRL Ninja (RF), and the SkySafe MM2 (RF).104 By integrating only specific sensors and 
incorporating a fusion algorithm, FOCUS can effectively relay information to the warfighter, 
without inundating the COP with extraneous or inaccurate information.  
The limitations of the FOCUS system are its form-factor and the limited number of 
compatible sensors. In its current state of development, CCDC’s system is designed for a 
general purpose force and optimized to be mounted into a vehicle due to its size and power 
requirements. As such, it is not an optimal tool for SOF units operating without a vehicular 
mobility capability. The system is also limited by the integrated sensors. While limiting the 
number of sensors allows SIM to function more efficiently, it also excludes potential detection 
capabilities, like radar (entirely) and other capable RF, EO/IR, and acoustic sensors.  
3. Defense Innovation Unit’s Dowding C-UAS System 
Another unique approach to UAS sensor integration is DIU’s server-based “Dowding 
C-UAS.”105 DIU named its project after the Dowding System, an air defense network 
developed during the Battle of Britain and named for Fighter Command’s Commander-in-
Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding.106 The World War 2 era Dowding System 
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“brought together technology, ground defenses and fighter aircraft into a unified system of 
defence” which “not only controlled the fighter force, but other elements…including anti-
aircraft guns, searchlights, and barrage balloons.”107 This full integration of humans, 
organizations, sensors, and shooters inspired DIU’s vision for the C-UAS tool.  
The Dowding C-UAS server uses government-open source software as a platform to 
ingest sensor data and exports CoT data to various situational awareness platforms. In this 
way, the Dowding Server functions much like a highly specialized, custom TAK server. In 
addition to a web user interface (UI), Dowding also pushes data to an Android-based UI and 
a developing ATAK plug-in. While the system does not currently work with all sensors, the 
modular nature of the software allows the DIU, or other users with access, to quickly add 
protocols to ingest specific sensor data. Unlike a typical ATAK plug-in, Dowding software is 
constantly monitored for version compatibility each time it is updated. This allows Dowding 
to run on different versions of ATAK without issue.  
Unlike other current solutions which are primarily designed around a single hardware 
solution, the Dowding system was also designed to work on multiple platforms to allow a 
variety of applications of the same software. Because of this modular design, Dowding can 
be run on a server, a computer, or even from a data cloud.  
The main drawback to the Dowding Server is its optimization for a high-bandwidth, 
internet connected network. Unlike ATAK, which is regularly used on low-bandwidth mesh 
networks, the Dowding Server typically runs as a cloud-based server hosted in Silicon Valley, 
CA. As such, most current Dowding users access the server from high speed internet 
connections within the continental United States. Even Dowding Servers that are not run from 
the DIU Rogue Squadron headquarters run most effectively when they are able to connect 
back to the main server regularly for updates.108 This presents an issue for SOF to use the 
Dowding Server in a tactical environment, where internet access and high-bandwidth 
networking are not a given.  
107 Imperial War Museums, “What Was The ‘Dowding System’?” 
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Each of these unique projects uses a different approach to bridge the gap between the 
C-UAS sensor and the useful digital COP. Even though these projects all seek to solve the 
issue broadly, none of them is designed specifically for SOF units. As such, the unique 
requirements of a small, dismounted team are not directly addressed. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Military doctrine requires commanders to understand and apply the concepts of 
mission command to accomplish their given missions. Key to this success is a clear and 
accurate understanding of the operating environment. On the contemporary battlefield, 
asymmetric threats, such as enemy UAS, endanger ground forces in a way not seen in previous 
years. To protect their units, commanders must develop sensor, collection, and dissemination 
plans adhering to the Principles of Protection. While current C-UAS technologies have 
advanced significantly in recent years, no single sensor provides exhaustive detection for all 
SUAS or all tactical applications. 
Additionally, these disparate sensors are rarely digitally incorporated into a single 
common operating picture that is optimized for the SOF operator. Established technologies, 
such as ATAK, allow leaders to make accurate, timely decisions and enhance their ability to 
execute mission command. Advancements in sensor technology allow more accurate and 
timely detection of SUAS threats. The integration of these sensors and SA tools continues to 
be the weakest link in the system. While technologies such as the Dowding Server show 
promise, they have not been tested on realistic SOF missions in austere environments. 
By integrating proven UAS sensors into the ATAK system, commanders could 
enhance their situational awareness and improve the protection of their units. This would be 
especially pertinent to SOF, as SOF units are inherently smaller, less centralized, and often 
operate with fewer defensive protective measures. Due to the prolific threat of cheap, effective 
LSS UAS, it is essential that existing and emerging technologies be integrated and leveraged 
to fill this capability gap. 
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III. EXPERIMENT EXECUTION 
To obtain useful data to answer our research questions, experimentation required 
live testing of situational awareness (SA) tools and counter-UAS (C-UAS) technologies 
with SOF operators. We accomplished this by conducting our field experiments with the 
Norwegian Special Operations Command’s Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK) and the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). The MJK is an elite maritime special 
warfare unit and trusted NATO-SOF partner to USSOF; their interoperability of tactics, 
techniques, and procedures has been proven for years in training and combat. Because 
of this partnership history, as well as their capabilities and force structure, we identified 
the MJK as an archetypal analog for SOF forces writ large.  
We leveraged established relationships with the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency (DTRA), Defense Innovation Unit’s Rogue Squadron (DIU-RS), and the U.S. 
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) G8, to design and resource an 
experimental setup to answer our research question: How can tactical situational 
awareness tools enhance decision making and survivability of SOF teams in an 
enemy SUAS-enabled environment? 
A. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Asymmetric Warfare Group’s (AWG) 2018 Defense-in-Depth Exercise 
(DiDEX) served as the underpinning for best practices when developing our experiment. 
While DiDEX brought together multiple C-UAS system vendors and conventional Army 
forces to explore “best practices for employing multiple CUAS capabilities against a 
low, slow, small UAS threat,” our experiment sought to dive deeper into the SOF 
specific requirements of C-UAS technologies.109  
To isolate the variables related to our research question, our testing was 
purposefully designed to place less emphasis on the efficacy of the SUAS sensors 
themselves and instead focus on the operator’s situational awareness requirements as 
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they applied to SUAS detection. We accomplished this by selecting a single sensor for 
all iterations of the experiments, conducting all tests within the range of the sensor, and 
flying SUAS listed in the RF library of the sensor. 
The detection and networking technologies used in the experiment were selected 
based on their availability and widespread use within USSOCOM. This was done to 
maximize the generalizability of our results to current SOF units. A diagram depicting 
all hardware and network equipment used during experimentation, with iconography, 
can be found in the Appendix. 
B. EXPERIMENT FRAMEWORK 
The experiment was divided into four phases: equipment and network bench 
tests, Dowding Server implementation, tactical field experimentation, and full mission 
profile experimentation. Each of the first three phases were divided into iterative and 
incremental subphases to ensure critical tasks were accomplished before the culminating 
experiment in Phase 4. Phases 1 and 2 were conducted locally and focused on meeting 
critical gateways to ensure viable and productive experiments during Phases 3 and 4. 
The final two phases consisted of two days of field experimentation in Bergen, Norway 
and sought to answer our research question through the execution of multiple scenarios 
varying in type and complexity. Table 3 lists the experiment phases and subphases. 
Table 3. Experiment Phases 
Phase 1—Equipment Downselect and Network Bench Tests 
Subphase A: TAK Bench Tests and MANET Connectivity 
Subphase B: SUAS Familiarization 
Phase 2—Dowding Server Implementation 
Subphase A: Dowding Familiarization, Simulation, and MANET Operations 
Subphase B: Dowding, ATAK, and SkyView Integration over MANET 
Phase 3—MJK Tactical Reconnaissance and Direct Action Testing 
Subphase A: Tactical Reconnaissance Mission Using ATAK 
Subphase B: Tactical Reconnaissance Mission Using Dowding 
Subphase C: Direct Action Mission Using Dowding 
Phase 4—MJK Maritime Special Reconnaissance Experiment 
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C. PHASE 1—EQUIPMENT DOWNSELECT AND NETWORK BENCH TESTS 
The purpose of Phase 1 was to establish consistent connectivity for all Android 
devices over the MANET and to familiarize the team with the operation of SUAS. Critical 
to this phase was establishing and maintaining a functional MANET, mastering ATAK 
operations, and certifying the SUAS pilot. At the end of Phase 1, the team was capable of 
operating situational awareness tools over the tactical MANET, and prepared to begin the 
integration of C-UAS sensors. Table 4 lists critical objectives by subphase. 
Table 4. Phase 1 Objectives 
Phase 1—Equipment Downselect and Network Bench Tests 
Subphase A: TAK Bench Tests and Mobile Ad Hoc Network Connectivity 
Objective 1: Establish communication between ATAK using various WLAN setups 
Objective 2: Determine feasibility of MANET configurations for Phases 3 and 4 
Objective 3: Train the team on ATAK operations 
Subphase B: SUAS Familiarization 
Objective 1: Familiarize team with SUAS operations 
Objective 2: Train and certify SUAS operator 
 
1. Phase 1A—TAK Bench Tests and Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
Connectivity 
The purpose of Phase 1A was to establish communication between ATAK-enabled 
Android tablets and Samsung cell phones using a wireless local area network (WLAN), and 
determine the feasibility of these networks for use in future experimentation. Once the Android 
devices were connected to the network, a simple communications test was conducted on each 
device. A successful test was determined if the device was able to accomplish two tasks: send 
and receive ATAK text messages with the other user and manually populate icons to a shared 
COP. The devices were bench tested using the following network set-ups (Figure 7). 
• Infrastructure mode WLAN  
• Closed, persistent mobile ad hoc network (MANET) 
• Persistent MANET with internet gateway 
• Intermittent MANET 
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Figure 7. Phase 1 Network Diagram
Infrastructure Mode Wireless Local Area Network Closed, Persistent MANET
Persistent MANET with Internet Gateway Intermittent MANET
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a. Actions 
A mobile Wi-Fi hot spot was used to establish the infrastructure mode WLAN. 
Both tablets were connected to the same hotspot using the wireless access point (WAP) 
hub and then tested. 
To establish the closed, persistent MANET, two MPU4s were configured to use 2 
Watts and operate at 2.462 GHz. The MPU4 and MPU5 radios are “software defined” 
which allows a trained communicator to program the radio for desired power use and set 
the time between transmitted and received signals. After initial setup, we made no 
modifications to MPU4 configurations for the remainder of the experiment. Each Android 
tablet was then connected to its assigned radio using the MPU4’s WAP feature and then 
tested. 
The persistent MANET with internet gateway was established by adding an 
additional MPU4 radio, a small network switch, and a Long Term Evolution (LTE) router 
to the closed, persistent MANET. The additional MPU4 was hard-lined into the network 
switch with the provided network cable adapter; the LTE router was then connected to the 
network switch using CAT-5e cable. The devices were then tested for ATAK 
communication capability, and the ability to access the internet.  
Following successful testing of the persistent MANET, the MPU4 radios were 
replaced with modified MPU5 radios and the test was repeated. Each MPU5 radio used 
throughout the experiment was modified by adding a SNMP plug-in agent programmed to 
record network performance and provide WAP capability (a feature removed in the 
transition from MPU4 to MPU5).  
GoTenna Pro radios were used to establish an intermittent, or “bursty,” MANET. 
These radios allow the transmission of short (roughly 250 ASCII characters) messages up 
to 47 miles. While the amount of transmitted data is extremely small, the radios allow the 
user to establish nearly undetectable MANETs over much greater distances than the MPU 
series radios. 
Following the series of network bench tests, the team conducted detailed 
familiarization and training with the ATAK. Previous conferences with MJK leadership 
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determined that many MJK operators had previous experience with ATAK, but their level 
of familiarity varied greatly; this objective served to mitigate this variable by ensuring 
members of the team were capable of instructing MJK operators on the proper use of the 
ATAK during Phases 3 and 4. 
This training included updating the firmware on all ATAK devices, managing team 
and user preferences, and in-depth exploration of the platform’s most commonly used 
capabilities. Each device was set to default configurations and moved applications to the 
home screen for ease of use. The TAK software relies on internet access to download 
updates, plug-ins, and maps. In anticipation of operating in an austere environment with 
only remote access to the internet, offline Norway maps were loaded onto all devices.  
b. Observations 
During Phase 1A, all objectives were achieved. All tested devices made positive 
communications tests using all network configurations without issue, with the exception of 
the persistent MANET using modified MPU5 radios. This error is discussed in detail in 
subsequent sections. 
(1) Persistent MANET 
While testing the MPU4 and MPU5 radio networks, the only observable difference 
occurred when testing the modified MPU5. While using MPU4 and unmodified MPU5 
radios, all devices communicated without error; when using the modified MPU5 radios, 
ATAK messages were not sent out from one MPU5 node to the other. Through subsequent 
testing, it was determined that, while a networked ATAK device could receive data on the 
modified MPU5 network, an error in the programming of the SNMP plug-in agent did not 
allow CoT messages to leave that MPU5 node. While this would limit the full functionality 
of the ATAK in future testing, it would still allow ATAK devices on modified MPU5 
MANET to receive data from SUAS sensors. 
(2) Radio Ranges and Software Configuration 
While not observed during bench testing, the MPU5 has a greater range than the 
MPU4 radio, but software configurations and terrain affect the maximum range. Because 
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the scope of Phase 1A did not encompass network performance at these maximum ranges, 
the team did not foresee how the initial MPU radio configurations selected would affect 
the future phases of experimentation. The decisions made in these earlier phases both 
facilitated and limited our experiments. Though it was assumed that network connectivity 
would vary over terrain and distances, the abnormalities in network performance due to 
differences in software configuration were not anticipated. These issues affected overall 
MANET performance, which ultimately altered experiment results. These limitations will 
be discussed further in Chapter IV. 
(3) MPU Wireless Access 
Although pairing Android devices using a WAP to the MPU4 and modified MPU5 
radios is a simple process, the connection between the radios and Android devices created 
an unnecessary point of technological failure that could be solved using a simple, 
hardwired adapter. Hardwired connections are physically more resilient, especially for the 
dismounted SOF operator. The WAP also poses a security threat due to the constant 
frequency emissions between radio and device, while a hardwired configuration removes 
the radio frequency signature. This issue will be discussed further in Phase 2. 
(4) Intermittent MANET 
ATAK enabled devices conducted successful communication tests using GoTenna 
radios without issue. Though this MANET setup worked consistently throughout testing, 
the minimal volume of data in each transmission was a point of concern, as at this phase 
of experimentation, the amount of data passed by the SkyView sensor and the Dowding 
Server had not been determined. Additionally, devices paired to both a persistent and 
intermittent MANET defaulted to transmitting and receiving over the GoTenna radio, and 
would not allow the device to access the MPU network. Because of these issues, the 
intermittent MANET was determined to be unfeasible for future phases of experimentation.  
(5) ATAK 
The Android devices owned by the Center for Network Innovation and 
Experimentation (CENETIX) were operating on various outdated versions of the TAK 
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APKs. TAK allows any person with a software development kit to create a plug-in, making 
the TAK system flexible and incredibly useful; however, as discussed in Chapter II, not all 
plug-ins are compatible with the different firmware versions. Baselining all devices to a 
common firmware controlled the variability between the devices and established a single 
standard for any required plug-ins.  
The realization that the ATAK’s maps would be severely limited when operating 
without internet access provided an important discussion point for other SA technologies. 
This would later lead to DIU’s creation of the “Offline Maps” function for the Dowding 
App, enabling the use of pre-loaded maps.  
2. Phase 1B—SUAS Familiarization 
To enable SUAS operations during Phases 3 and 4, the team conducted and 
observed SUAS training at the Fort Ord Combined Arms Collective Training Facility 
(CACTF). 
a. Actions 
The team met with Dr. Kevin Jones, the lead for UAS integration at NPS and a 
professor in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, at the Fort Ord 
CACTF. The team conducted familiarization flights using a Ryze Tello SUAS, depicted in 
Figure 8, to master controls and behavior of the aircraft in an urban training environment.  
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Figure 8. Ryze Tello Drone with DJI Avionics Next to Controller and Phone 
Next, the team moved to a rural training area where Dr. Jones demonstrated high-
performance drone flight and discussed best practices and techniques operating SUAS in 
various environments. Finally, the group discussed UAS research conducted by NPS and 
how our research focused on the C-UAS aspect of detection and situational awareness. 
b. Observations 
Although the Tello is much smaller than the Mavic and Matrice models, the flight 
controls are nearly identical. The Tello and Mavic model SUAS are also both Gyro-
stabilized quadcopters that use DJI technology. While they offer different levels of 
endurance and peak performance, these drones behave similarly to control input. These 
technologies also allow both aircraft to hover without user control, which drastically 
impacts the ease of flight. The Tello’s controls were intuitive, responsive, and would later 
prove to be very similar to drones used in subsequent phases.  
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Throughout this phase, the team gained a greater appreciation for the requirements 
to fly commercially available SUAS, as well as the function they provide a user. The SUAS 
used during this phase are similar in capability to those used by enemy forces in conflict 
zones. By testing these drones in different situations, the team was able to better understand 
the information SUAS can provide an enemy, and were able to confirm the limitations of 
the equipment and the requirements of the pilot for conducting these operations. 
D. PHASE 2—DOWDING SERVER IMPLEMENTATION 
The purpose of Phase 2 was to build and test the experimental setup to be used in 
Phases 3 and 4. Critical to this phase was development of a fully functional Dowding Server 
machine capable of operating over a closed MANET and integration of the SkyView C-
UAS sensor into the Dowding Server and TAK environment. Table 5 lists critical 
objectives by subphase. 
Table 5. Phase 2 Objectives 
Phase 2—Dowding Server Implementation 
Subphase A: Dowding Familiarization, Simulation, and MANET Operations 
Objective 1: Operate the Dowding Test-Server on a MANET 
Objective 2: Simulate SUAS flights over Dowding while on a MANET 
Objective 3: Conduct initial testing of NPS-Dowding Server machine 
Subphase B: Dowding, ATAK, and SkyView Integration over MANET 
Objective 1: Integrate SkyView sensor with the ATAK and Dowding Server 
Objective 2: Identify capabilities and limitations of equipment when operating on a 
MANET 
 
1. Phase 2A—Dowding Familiarization, Simulation, and MANET 
Operations 
During Phase 2A, the team tested the Dowding Test-Server, simulation tool, and 
app over the tactical MANET and began testing the NPS-Dowding Server machine. The 
purpose of this experiment was to familiarize the team with the Dowding System and to 
establish the feasibility of using the Dowding System on a tactical MANET for use in future 
phases of experimentation. 
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a. Actions 
During Phase 2A, the Dowding App was loaded onto all Android devices (cell 
phones and tablets) and the Dowding Simulator program was loaded onto all computers by 
accessing the DIU-Rogue Squadron C-UAS Products page. Two cell phones, two tablets, 
and a laptop were networked using an infrastructure WLAN (control) and a tactical 
MANET (proof of concept). Once networked, the laptop was logged into the Dowding 
Test-Server and the Android devices were connected to the server using the Dowding App. 
The Dowding Test-Server was also observed from a desktop computer, connected to the 
NPS high-speed internet; this served as a control for observing the Dowding App’s 
performance on the tactical MANET. Once all devices were connected to the server, the 
Dowding Simulator was used to create a simulated drone detection by running the 
“Dowding-Sim” script from the command line of the laptop. Figure 9 shows a successful 
simulation on an Android device using the Dowding Simulator. This test was conducted 
several times to observe issues with connectivity, latency, and to identify discrepancies 
between the interfaces on the tested devices and networks. 
Following the proof of concept, DIU created the NPS-Dowding Server, a laptop 
loaded with a developmental version of the Dowding Server, that had been optimized for 
portability and to receive changes from the centralized Dowding Web-Server. The NPS-
Dowding Server was designed to test the functionality of the system in more austere 
environments and would serve as the primary mechanism for Phases 3 and 4 of testing. As 
seen in Figure 10, the NPS-Dowding Server was bench tested using the same protocols as 
previous iterations and its performance was examined using a tactical MANET with 
internet gateway as well as a closed tactical MANET. 
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Figure 9. Successful Dowding Simulator Test at NPS 
 




During the Dowding System familiarization and simulation testing, the team made 
the following observations: 
(1) Tactical MANET 
For the majority of testing, there were minimal issues with the tactical MANET 
with the notable exception of the MPU4 WAP connection. During numerous tests, devices 
were unable to connect to the MPU4 WAP. After using the Wave Relay software to view 
radio diagnostics, the system had reset the internal clock to January 2000. This 
desynchronization of the GPS time and the internal clock caused the WAP to reject 
additional connection leases, which prevented the devices from connecting. To solve the 
issue, the system was set to “do not renew connection leases” and the internal clock was 
manually set to 2020, causing all leases to expire. The manual over-ride of the internal 
clock was then released, allowing additional devices to be connected. While this issue was 
eventually solvable through relatively simple troubleshooting, it could have been avoided 
altogether by using a wired connection vice a WAP. 
(2) Dowding Test-Server 
Throughout Phase 2A testing, the Dowding app and simulator functioned well 
while connected to the Dowding Test-Server. The functioning Dowding Simulator was 
critical for the experiment, as poor weather conditions in Norway could potentially prevent 
UAS flight. When running the simulator, users noted the utility of the radar-like interface 
that allowed the operator to quickly orient to the drone threat both by distance and direction 
and the augmented reality (AR) feature that could more accurately refine the drone’s 
position. During simulation, the drone’s virtual image as seen using the AR function and 
the distance and direction provided by the radar interface both matched its simulated 
location on the Dowding App’s COP.  
The Dowding Test-Server’s overall performance operating on the MANET nearly 
matched performance with the simulator operating on a high-speed internet connection. 
Simultaneously comparing the displayed COPs on the different devices, there did not 
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appear to be a difference in latency between the simulation on the tactical MANET vice 
the highspeed internet. Icons for simulated detections appeared at nearly the same time on 
all devices, and the COPs updated at roughly the same rate. Figure 11 depicts the team 
observing for latency issues. 
 
Figure 11. Observing for Latency Issues Between Dowding Web Application 
and Dowding over MANET 
There was a major discrepancy, however, between the two networks when the 
Dowding Server required new maps. When a detection occurred in an area without 
previously cached maps, the Dowding Server used a high-speed internet connection to 
resolve the maps nearly instantaneously. Conversely, devices connected to the tactical 
MANET required approximately ten additional seconds to load the same maps; even more 
time was required to refine resolution to a more zoomed in location. This is noteworthy, 
because these differences in time were observed under ideal conditions. Each node of the 
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tactical MANET likely had one-hop access to the broadband router and had multiple routes 
to access the gateway because of the network proximity during this phase of testing. In a 
more realistic test, a node may be only connected to one other node and that node may not 
be directly connected to the internet gateway. Although latency was not a major issue 
during this test, it was determined that the Dowding App would require an offline map 
function to be useful in the future phases. 
(3) NPS-Dowding Server 
When connected to the tactical MANET with internet gateway, the NPS-Dowding 
Server functioned much the same as the Dowding Test-Server. The only marked 
differences between the two servers during this test was the ability to use offline maps, 
which was not used on the webserver, and the ability to see only detections ingested by the 
NPS-Dowding Server.110  
The Dowding App and Server became much more unstable when operating on the 
closed tactical MANET. The NPS-Dowding Server remained suitably stable as long as the 
network maintained an internet gateway. Without internet connectivity, the server would 
often display startup errors and failed to allow Dowding App-enabled devices to remain 
consistently logged in. As such, the experimental design was modified for Phases 3 and 4 
to always include an internet gateway.  
2. Phase 2B—Dowding, ATAK, and SkyView Integration over MANET 
The purpose of Phase 2B was to finalize the integration of the SkyView sensor by 
testing the SkyView-Dowding Integration Application (SDIA) using the NPS-Dowding 
Server and the ATAK, and to identify the capabilities and limitations of the experimental 
equipment when operating on a tactical MANET. To accomplish this, we tested the system 
using various network modalities to determine the performance differences and feasibility 
of future field experimentation. 
                                                 
110 The Dowding Test-Server is a cloud-based server that is used throughout the United States. At 
demonstrations and tests conducted by DIU-RS, all of the detection information populates on the Dowding 
Test-Server and can be seen by all devices logged into the server. 
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a. Actions 
All of the software engineering required was completed at DIU Rogue Squadron 
by LtCol Mark Jacobsen and his team; the field and bench testing over the MANET was 
completed in the CENETIX lab at NPS.  
The SDIA was engineered to complete two tasks: to visually display the sensor’s 
data on the Dowding interface and to simultaneously populate the appropriate icons in the 
TAK environment. To accomplish this, DIU established parameters within the SkyView’s 
server to push CoT data directly to the Dowding Server using transmission control protocol 
(TCP). Once the data reached the Dowding Server, the SDIA would run two near-
simultaneous tasks: redirect the CoT data across the entire network using user datagram 
protocol (UDP) multicast and translate the raw CoT into the appropriate language for the 
Dowding Server to ingest the information. By multicasting the CoT data across the 
network, SDIA effectively populated the appropriate drone or GCS icons on all connected 
ATAK platforms. Translating the CoT into the Dowding Server’s language enables users 
of the Dowding WebUI and Android App to view the appropriate icons, and will allow the 
server to efficiently push information to other applications, such as ATAK or other SA 
tools, for future use. Figure 12 depicts the SDIA configuration. 
 













To initiate the SDIA, the user powered on both the SkyView sensor and the NPS-
Dowding Server. Once both the sensor and server are powered on, the user inputs the SDIA 
run command into the terminal of the NPS-Dowding Server machine. The SDIA then 
connects to the SkyView feed and begins “listening” for outputs from the sensor. All 
message traffic between the sensor and server are displayed within the terminal window as 
long as the SDIA is running.  
At DIU, the SkyView sensor was networked directly to the NPS-Dowding Server 
machine using a CAT5e cable, while the NPS-Dowding Server, tablets, and cell phones 
were connected to the DIU network by wireless access hub. Figure 13 depicts the SkyView 
configurations and subsequent modifications. The SDIA was bench tested using the 
SkyView sensor to detect a DJI Mavic Pro Platinum while observers monitored the ATAK 
and Dowding App using the tablets and cell phones. Following a successful bench test of 
the SDIA, all experimental equipment was taken back to NPS for operational testing on 
the tactical MANET. 
 
Figure 13. SkyView Sensor Network Configurations 
Configuration 1:  
Used to develop SkyView-Dowding 
Integration Application (SDIA)
Configuration 2:  
Used to connect SkyView on a 
MANET node
Configuration 3:  
Used to connect SkyView on a 
MANET node when using the 
Raspberry Pi SNMP recorder
Dowding
1B:  Connected to Offline Server
Dowding Server
1A:  Connected to Cloud Server
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Once back at NPS, the Dowding Server, SkyView sensor, and Android devices 
were networked into the MANET using MPU4 radios. All tactical MANET nodes 
remained within 20 meters of each other throughout the experiment. Following a successful 
connectivity test of the network and all attached devices, the SDIA was tested by using the 
SkyView to detect Mavic Pro Platinum and DJI Matrice drones while observers monitored 
the ATAK and the Dowding App from tablets and cell phones. Using the initial test as a 
base, the system was tested in various network configurations, and other variables were 
introduced to explore the capabilities of the system and to identify differences in the ATAK 
and Dowding App interfaces. The following tests were conducted during Phase 2B and are 
depicted in Figure 14: 
• Closed, tactical MANET 
• Tactical MANET with internet gateway 
• Tactical MANET with internet gateway; SkyView sensor networked as 
separate node  








SDIA Development Closed, Tactical MANET
Tactical MANET with Internet Gateway SkyView as Separate Node
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b. Observations 
During Phase 2B, the team made the following observations: 
(1) COP Appearance 
During the testing on both structured and ad-hoc networks, the SDIA accurately 
populated icons on both the ATAK and the Dowding App. There was no noticeable 
difference in the COP appearance between any of the tested network configurations on 
either application.  
When running the SDIA and Dowding Simulator in parallel, the UAS and ground 
control station (GCS) icons populated from both programs on the Dowding App. Because 
the Dowding Simulator was not designed to push information to the TAK environment, 
these icons did not appear on the ATAK. 
(2) Alerts 
The Dowding App enabled devices to receive timely warnings following a 
SkyView detection and, at the end-user level, seemed to be unaffected by the network 
architecture. While using the SDIA and Dowding Simulator concurrently, devices received 
consistent alerts from both programs without issue.  
(3) Latency 
Users did not observe a significant difference in latency between the ATAK and 
Dowding App on any of the tested networks. There was no perceived difference in 
detection time, latency, or accuracy when the SkyView was networked into a separate node 
vice directly connected to the Dowding Server. There did not appear to be any delays 
associated with running the SDIA and Dowding Simulator concurrently. 
(4) Indexing the Threat 
The Dowding App’s augmented reality (AR) and radar interface seemed to function 
more smoothly when using the Dowding Simulator vice data from the SkyView sensor. 
Even on a stationary drone, the “drone indicator box” for a SkyView detection was much 
less stable and more difficult to index. When using SDIA and the Dowding Simulator in 
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unison, both the AR and radar interface functioned in a manner nearly identical to the 
independent operation of each program. The presence of an internet gateway made no 
observable difference in the performance of either the AR function or the radar interface. 
(5) Stability 
As seen in Phase 2A, the NPS-Dowding Server and Dowding App remained more 
stable when networked to an internet gateway. Without an internet gateway, the Dowding 
Server did not function consistently enough for field testing. There was no observable 
difference in the stability of the Dowding App or the NPS-Dowding Server when both the 
SDIA and Dowding Simulator were in operation. Neither the ATAK nor the SkyView 
sensor appeared to be affected by either the network configuration or the presence of an 
internet gateway.  
E. PHASE 3—MJK TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AND DIRECT 
ACTION TESTING 
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the graphic user interfaces (GUI) 
of the ATAK and Dowding Apps as a situational awareness tool while conducting tactical 
operations in a high-UAS threat environment. Secondarily, we evaluated the capabilities 
of the SkyView RF sensor as part of an integrated C-UAS system. Table 6 lists critical 
objectives by subphase. This experiment supported the following research questions: 
• How can the integration of C-UAS sensors with tactical situational 
awareness tools enhance decision making and survivability of SOF teams? 
• What factors affect ATAK UI usability in support of C-UAS SA? 




Table 6. Phase 3 Objectives 
Phase 3—MJK Tactical Reconnaissance and Direct Action 
Testing 
Subphase A: Tactical Reconnaissance Mission Using ATAK 
Objective 1: Examine ATAK SDIA GUI while conducting tactical reconnaissance 
Subphase B: Tactical Reconnaissance Mission Using Dowding 
Objective 1: Examine Dowding GUI while conducting tactical reconnaissance 
Subphase C: Direct Action Missing Using Dowding 
Objective 1: Examine Dowding GUI during active, high-intensity operation 
 
1. Participants 
The MJK team consisted of one experienced Non-Commissioned Officer from a 
MJK squadron, while the remaining five operators were recent graduates of the MJK 
training course conducting advanced training as part of their overall assessment pipeline. 
Because many of the operators participating in the experiment were new to the MJK, they 
had little experience with the ATAK system. Unlike the more seasoned MJK operators 
who regularly use the ATAK and other situational awareness tools, the operators in this 
experiment had no predisposition to a particular tool. Prior to testing, all operators were 
issued equipment and familiarized with the capabilities of each item. Each operator was 
issued an end user device (Samsung S5 or S6 cell phone) with both the ATAK and 
Dowding applications and an MPU4 or MPU5 mesh radio. 
By having SOF operators conduct tactical missions using these different 
applications, we observed factors affecting a small unit when attempting to gain and 
maintain situational awareness regarding threat UAS. 
2. Site 
The testing was conducted at Wolf Camp, a Norwegian Armed Forces training area 
located in the rural-urban fringe south of Haakonsvern Naval Base. Wolf Camp provided 
a large, open training space with rolling hills and several buildings. Aircraft during the 
experiment were cleared up to 400m above ground level (AGL) throughout Wolf Camp. 
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3. Method 
This experiment was conducted in three separate sub-phases. Phase 3A consisted 
of a simple, tactical reconnaissance mission using ATAK as the primary SA tool. During 
Phase 3B, the operators conducted the same reconnaissance mission using the Dowding 
App as the primary tool. During Phase 3C, the team conducted a direct-action assault while 
using the Dowding App as the primary SA tool.  
The Observation Team, consisting of one NPS student and an MJK squadron 
commander, maintained two large ATAK and Dowding enabled tablets, two MPU5 radios, 
and the SkyView MP UAS detector. Throughout the experiment, the Observation Team 
moved with the MJK team and served as the notional higher headquarters for that element. 
The observation team monitored the actions of the operators, taking note of technical and 
user interface factors in real time. 
The UAS pilots, two NORSOF UAS specialists and an NPS research associate, 
maintained a fleet of six drones, including a DJI Mavic Pro Platinum, DJI Mavic 
Enterprise, DJI Phantom 2, Parrot Bebop, Prox Dynamics Black Hornet, and 
AeroVironment RQ-20 Puma. The UAS pilots were positioned according to their utility 
and the tactical plan of each iteration.  
The Control Team, consisting of two NPS students, maintained the network, ran 
the Dowding Server, and managed the conduct of the testing from a mobile command 
center established in an MJK van. The control team’s equipment consisted of the NPS 
Dowding Server (Dell XPS P56F), WinTAK enabled computer (Windows SurfaceBook 
Pro), MPU4, MPU5, LTE router, and a SNMP agent manager tool. The Control Team 
remained in the administrative area throughout testing and monitored the COPs using 
WinTAK and the NPS Dowding Server. Figure 15 shows the Control Team in the mobile 
command center, and Figure 16 depicts the network diagram for this phase. 
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Figure 15. Control Team Using Dowding Server (Left) and SNMP Agent 
Manager Tool (Right) in the Mobile Command Center 
 





4. Phase 3A: Tactical Reconnaissance Mission Using ATAK 
During this phase, the MJK team leader was given a reconnaissance objective and 
several minutes to plan an infiltration route and observation points within the training area. 
Upon completion of planning, the Control and Observation teams tested all issued 
equipment for functionality and troubleshot any errors with the equipment, ensuring all 
devices were running both the ATAK and Dowding App, with the ATAK as the active 
window. Once all equipment was deemed operational, the team conducted a tactical 
movement to their observation points and began their reconnaissance of the target building.  
a. Actions 
Once in position, the SUAS pilots launched a DJI Mavic Pro (identified to the team 
by its location as friendly) and a DJI Mavic Enterprise (not identified to the team as 
friendly). The friendly SUAS flew as a defensive sensor; the pilot remained 200m behind 
the MJK element, while the drone itself flew small patterns 100-150m behind the MJK 
element. As shown in Figure 17, the unidentified SUAS acted as an offensive sensor for 
the notional enemy forces; the pilot was positioned near the target building, while the drone 
itself flew aggressive observation patterns throughout the operating area. 
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Figure 17. Phase 3A and 3B Concept Sketch 
b. Observations 
The team made the following observations in Phase 3A. 
(1) COP Appearance 
While using the ATAK as the primary situational awareness tool, four of the six 
operators observed both drones and one pilot/ground control station (GCS) icon populated 
on their individual COP. Two of the operators’ COPs only populated one of the drones 
with its corresponding GCS. As seen in Figure 18, all icons populated as yellow (unknown 
affiliation) units or equipment and were differentiated by doctrinal unit/equipment 
modifiers within the icon, as well as a captioned label below the icon. When the operators 
attempted to manually change the affiliation of the drone or GCS from ‘unknown’ to 
‘enemy’ or to ‘friendly,’ the icon would only change momentarily, before returning to its 
original orientation as the CoT data passed from SkyView would overwrite all of the made 
changes. Additionally, the ATAK COP only showed the “current” location of the drone, 
rather than a track of its movement, and did not provide the ability to view previous 
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detections. This feature will be discussed later, as the Dowding App provides this 
information. 
 
Figure 18. ATAK with Two “Live” Drones, One GCS, and One “Stale” 
Drone Icon 
(2) Alerts 
MJK operators noted a lack of alerts within the ATAK interface. While the initial 
appearance of SUAS icons generally occurred within seconds of the SkyView detection, 
the system lacked a distinct audible, visual, or haptic warning other than the unremarkable 
appearance of a SUAS icon. As such, using the ATAK alone required an individual to 
constantly reference his device to determine the presence of a SUAS. Of note, we observed 
some operators receive “Push” alerts from the Dowding App while they were using the 
ATAK as their primary COP; this function is addressed during Phase 3B and 3C. While it 
is possible to set up a form of alerts by using the ATAK’s geofencing function, the 
operators did not employ this method during the experiment. 
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(3) Latency 
There was a noticeable lag in the movement of the icons as compared to the actual 
flight of the drone. While we observed SkyView broadcasting CoT data every second (and 
sometimes more frequently), the operators saw 30-60 second delays in the movement of 
the icons on their COP.111  
(4) Indexing the Threat 
The delay in icon population, combined with the previously discussed lack of 
“tracks,” made observing subtle drone movements or flight path analysis nearly impossible. 
Additionally, because the ATAK merely populated an icon on the COP, locating a detected 
drone in space was not a quick, streamlined process. To visually identify the drone, the 
operators needed to quickly reference the location of the threat icon against either a feature 
on the map, such as buildings or hilltops, or by using their location and calculating a general 
azimuth derived from the COP. 
(5) Stability 
The operators remarked on the stability of the application. Throughout Phase 3A, 
the ATAK app continued to run, without a single crash. When the ATAK app lost 
connection to the network, and thus access to SkyView and other devices, the COP still 
provided operators some level of functionality, including viewing cached maps, 
manipulating previously populated icons, and manually placing additional icons. 
(6) Overall Assessment 
While the C-UAS specific capabilities of the ATAK were limited, the consistency 
of the application and its usefulness across a variety of missions make it optimal for use in 
tactical situations. The general situational awareness provided by the ATAK, such as 
                                                 
111 Delays on the Galaxy phones were much more significant than that observed on the Observer 
Team’s own tablets. While the Observers’ tablets maintained a consistent delay under 30 seconds, some of 
the operator devices only updated once a minute or slower. This may be attributable to the MPU4 radios, 
which stopped functioning entirely after this iteration.  
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locations of teammates, the ability to communicate within the app, and ability to manually 
place icons on the COP, allowed operators to use the app in various scenarios. 
5. Phase 3B: Tactical Reconnaissance Mission Using Dowding 
This subphase was nearly identical in construct to Phase 3A, with the exception of 
team size, and the use of the Dowding App as the primary situational awareness tool. Due 
to significant technical issues with the MPU4 radios, the size of the maneuver element was 
reduced to the team leader and two additional operators.112 Actions during Phase 3B 
mirrored the actions in the previous phase. Both friendly and enemy UAS flew patterns 
similar to those seen in the previous phase; Observation and Control teams maintained their 
previous positions. Since both Phase 3B and Phase 3C used the Dowding App, observations 
have been consolidated in the more complex Phase 3C. 
6. Phase 3C: Direct Action Mission Using Dowding 
Unlike the first two subphases, Phase 3C focused on the use of situational 
awareness tools during a more active, high-intensity operation. During this subphase, only 
three of the six operators received radios and SA devices (the team leader and his two 
assistant team leaders). The team leader was given a mission to raid an identified enemy 
building and provided several minutes to plan the conduct of the operation. After briefing 
his team, the Control and Observation teams tested all equipment for functionality and 
troubleshot any errors, ensuring the Dowding App was running and viewable as the main 
window. Following the checks, the team conducted a tactical movement to the target 
building, established an outer cordon, and cleared the building. Once clear, the team 
established a hasty defense and was ordered to return to their starting point as depicted in 
Figure 19.  
                                                 
112 During Phase 3B, we observed significant issues maintaining a connection to the Dowding Server 
using MPU4 radios. After troubleshooting for an extended period of time, we decided to reduce the number 
of operators and use only MPU5 radios, which were not experiencing the same issues.  
62 
 
Figure 19. Phase 3C Concept Sketch 
a. Actions 
During this iteration, the UAS pilots began flying as soon as the team began their 
movement and continued to fly throughout. The team was briefed that there would be no 
friendly UAS during this operation. UAS pilots flew sorties of three different aircraft. The 
DJI Mavic Pro acted as an offensive sensor for the notional enemy forces; the pilot 
remained in the administrative area, while the drone followed the team’s movement and 
then circled the building once the team was inside. The DJI Mavic Enterprise acted as a 
defensive sensor for the notional enemy forces; the pilot was positioned 100m behind the 
target building, and the drone flew sweeping patterns around the far side of the target 
building. The Parrot Bebop was launched once the team had reached the target building 
and acted as an offensive sensor for the enemy forces. The Control Team also launched 
two simulated drone contacts that originated near the target building and flew random 




• SOF team conducts a dismounted raid in 
a high-threat, enemy UAS-enabled 
environment.  
• Team employs C-UAS sensors to detect 
them using the Defense Innovation 
Unit’s Dowding Server and ATAK via a 
Wireless Mesh Network (WMN).
• Three enemy UAS overflew and provided 
the enemy with real-time intelligence.
• The team’s sensors enabled them to take 
protective measures to continue the 
mission.
2.  Enemy UAS converge on SOF team during Actions on the 
Objective.  Dowding and ATAK provide Enemy UAS locations.
1.  Enemy UAS screens infiltration route.  Integrated SkyView 




The operators were directed to use the Dowding App as the primary SA tool for all 
iterations of Phases 3B and 3C of the experiment. Compared to the ATAK, the Dowding 
App provided several C-UAS-specific capabilities that were useful in enhancing SA during 
both iterations. 
(1) COP Appearance 
The Dowding App COP presented a simple, clean appearance. All functioning 
Dowding devices populated icons for both drones and their corresponding GCS. Unlike 
the doctrinal icons displayed in the ATAK, in the Dowding, drones were represented by 
colored, circular icons with small quad-copters in the center, while the GCS was 
represented by a person of the corresponding color. Figure 20 graphically depicts the 
Dowding App’s user interface. This marked difference in appearance allowed the operators 
to differentiate between the GCS and the drone, with a quick glance at their device. 
 
Figure 20. Dowding App with Both Unknown (Yellow) and Friendly (Green) 
Icons 
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Additionally, Dowding provided real-time tracks of the detected drones, enabling 
the operators to see the pattern already flown. The app also allowed users to view historical 
detections for a specific time block, which was useful for both hasty analysis while on 
target and for debriefs after the mission. Though the ability to see a drone’s previous flight 
path was very useful both during and after the operation, the tracks of a single drone flight 
would often appear as multiple, segmented flights, rather than a continuous single track.113 
This inconsistency appeared to confuse the operators and resulted in the team leader 
misreporting the number of drones in the area. 
(2) Alerts 
The Dowding App alerted the operators to the SkyView detection of a nearby 
drone, by providing an audible alert, a visual “pop-up” box, and device vibration to gain 
the attention of the user. This function alerted the operators to a SUAS threat without 
requiring them to look at their SA device.  
(3) Latency 
Both the operators and observers experienced a significantly more up-to-date COP 
when using the Dowding App vice the ATAK. During Phase 3A, we observed 30-60+ 
second delays between COP updates; with Dowding, we rarely observed more than 15 
seconds of latency and generally observed updates in near real-time. This consistent 
information flow allowed the team to more accurately identify and report the locations of 
drones throughout Phases 3B and 3C than they did in Phase 3A. 
(4) Indexing the Threat 
The Dowding App maintains a self-orienting, radar-like display that allows 
operators to quickly identify the location of the threat in the air without manually 
manipulating the map. This feature appeared to be extremely useful while conducting 
                                                 
113 It is unclear whether this was a function of Dowding interpreting the SkyView data as a new 
flight, or SkyView losing its “lock” on a drone and then re-detecting the same aircraft and reporting it as a 
“new detection.” 
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decisive action operations, like Phase 3C, when operators needed to identify and locate a 
threat in a minimal amount of time. 
When using Dowding’s Augmented Reality (AR) function, the operators were able 
to locate the “drone indicator” box, but the box rarely accurately correlated to the location 
of the detected UAS. Often the reported elevation of the drone was significantly different 
than the actual elevation, resulting in the “drone indicator” box presenting the drone as on 
the ground when it was, in fact, more than 100 feet in the air. Though the operators 
expressed potential utility of this function, in practice, the capability was more distracting 
than useful in identifying an airborne threat. 
(5) Stability 
The most notable issue observed during the experiment was the general instability 
of the Dowding App. While the server itself remained up and active through the entire 
exercise, a majority of our Dowding App devices lost connection to the server 
intermittently throughout the day. The Control and Observer Teams experienced this issue 
regularly during three actions: toggling between historical tracks and live detection, 
switching from the ATAK to the Dowding App after not actively viewing the app for 
extended periods, and when the operators reached the edge of their radio’s range.  
Additionally, we observed several instances when the app crashed upon initial UAS 
detection as operators manipulated the map to locate the detected drone.114 Once the app 
crashed, operators had to restart the app and re-logon to the Dowding Server, a process that 
the operators were rarely able to quickly complete in the middle of an operation. Upon 
restarting the app, users observed latent icons and tracks for several minutes, even while 
receiving current detections. This juxtaposition of current and previous detections confused 
the operator as to the correct number of drones in the area. 
                                                 
114 This bug was quickly fixed in a subsequent release of the Dowding App, but we were unable to 
test the functionality during our experiments. 
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(6) Overall Assessment 
Operators commented that Dowding lacked the general COP functionality that the 
ATAK provides. The Dowding App only allows users to see their own location and the 
location of the drones detected by the networked sensor. It does not provide the locations 
of other Dowding users or the locations of the sensors on the network. As seen with the 
ATAK, the team noted the inability to manually change the affiliation of the aircraft within 
the Dowding App itself. As such, all detected drones remained marked as “unknown” icons 
on the COP, whether or not their association had previously been identified. Overall, the 
operators found the interface and C-UAS specific capabilities of the Dowding App useful 
but remarked on the shortcoming of its performance in a field environment. 
c. SkyView 
While not a specific experimentation objective, we observed and noted aspects of 
the performance of the SkyView sensor.  
(1) Limitations of RF detection 
Overall, SkyView consistently detected drones quickly and accurately, providing 
the location of both the aircraft and GCS for two of the six drones used during testing. 
Because SkyView is a library-based RF detection device, the sensor did not detect the 
majority of the drones we employed, including the Puma, Bebop, Phantom 2, and Black 
Hornet. As discussed in Chapter II, this is a known risk when using only an RF sensor. The 
sensor can only be as precise as the library of signals loaded into the system. 
(2) Detections without appropriate alerts 
During one iteration of Phase 3, the SkyView detected the DJI Mavic Pro but failed 
to identify the GPS location of either the drone or the GCS even though both devices were 
actively connected to GPS. While the SkyView correctly identified the presence of a drone 
in the area (and provided an audible “alert” using the provided audio output), because there 
was no GPS data, no icons populated on either the Dowding App or ATAK user interfaces. 
This issue represents a significant gap in the integration of SkyView with both of the tested 
SA tools. 
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F. PHASE 4—MJK MARITIME SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE 
EXPERIMENT 
Phase 4 of testing focused on the use of the Dowding App during the conduct of a 
low-visibility, special reconnaissance missions in a maritime and land-based environment. 
During this phase, MJK operators used both applications during a full-mission profile 
training mission. Unlike Phase 3, the experiment participants were all seasoned operators, 
and members of an organic squadron task-organized into surveillance teams. These 
operators had previous experience with the ATAK and had undergone familiarization and 
training with the Dowding App during Phase 3 of our testing. 
1. Introduction 
During this phase, operators participated in a lengthy surveillance exercise where 
the threat of enemy UAS was possible. The testing was conducted on the southern portion 
of Askøy, an island municipality, north of Haakonsvern Naval base, as seen in Figure 21. 
The operational area spanned roughly 25 square miles of hilly terrain and the inland bays 
of a North Sea fjord and is scattered with urban villages throughout. 
 






• SOF teams, in maritime and ground 
domains, employ C-UAS sensors via 
the Defense Innovation Unit’s 
Dowding Server and ATAK over a 
Wireless Mesh Network (WMN).
• Maritime team, with SkyView C-UAS 
sensor and MPU5 WMN radio, detects 
Enemy UAS and shares info with 
Friendly units via Dowding and ATAK. 
• Ground team manages Dowding 
Server and WMN performance 
remotely.
• SOF Maritime and Ground teams 
enhance protection and lethality due 
to enhanced situational awareness of 
all UAS in their AO.
1.  Enemy UAS launches against MJK maritime C2 while Control 
team manages Dowding Server and MANET.
2.  SkyView detects UAS approaching MJK C2, then populates 
on Dowding and ATAK.  Enemy UAS hovers overhead. 





The purpose of this experiment was to examine the utility of the Dowding App as 
a situational awareness tool while conducting low-visibility operations in an environment 
where enemy UAS presented a threat. Table 7 lists critical objectives. This experiment 
supported the following research questions: 
• How can situational awareness tools enhance decision making and 
survivability of SOF teams in an enemy SUAS-enabled environment? 
• What factors affect the Dowding App UI usability in support of C-UAS 
SA? 
Table 7. Phase 4 Objectives 
Phase 4—MJK Maritime Special Reconnaissance Experiment 
Objective 1: Examine utility of Dowding as a SA tool during low-visibility operations 
where enemy UAS present a threat 
Objective 2: Examine Dowding performance on a MANET in ground and maritime 
environments 




Because the training event itself was conducted as a single continuous operation, 
this phase of experimentation was also conducted as such.  
The MJK team consisted of 20 operators from an MJK squadron divided into four 
surveillance teams and a command and control element. Each surveillance team comprised 
2-4 operators with low-visibility communications equipment. The teams had mobility 
platforms in the form of civilian cars or small boats. Before testing, the operators were 
familiarized with the equipment and operating systems they would use during the 
experiment. Three of the surveillance teams were issued one MPU5 radio and one end user 
device for viewing the ATAK and the Dowding Application.  
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The MJK C2 element consisted of a troop commander and UAS section on a 
modified 35-foot civilian boat. In addition to their organic communications equipment, the 
MJK C2 element maintained an AeroVironment RQ-20 Puma UAS, two MPU5 Radios, 
two large Dowding and ATAK capable tablets, and the SkyView RF detector. Figure 22 
depicts the MJK maritime C2 node and network configuration. 
 
Figure 22. Phase 4 Network Diagram 
The Observation Team, consisting of one NPS Student and the squadron 
commander, were divided between the MJK C2 element and the surveillance teams. The 
Observation Team used commercial communications infrastructure to relay issues and 
observations to the Control Team. 
The Threat UAS pilots, two NORSOF UAS specialists and an NPS research 
associate, maintained a DJI Mavic Pro Platinum and a DJI Mavic Enterprise. The Threat 





The Control Team, consisting of two NPS students, maintained a network structure 
similar to the framework used during Phase 3, without the MPU4 radios. The Control Team 
were repositioned throughout the operation to maintain the mesh network.  
3. Scenario 
During this phase, the MJK squadron was given a reconnaissance objective, another 
MJK operator dressed in civilian clothes, and told to maintain visual contact of the 
individual and to report his route and stops. The targeted individual was to conduct a 
circuitous, multi-modal movement through the operational area, to include the littoral areas 
using civilian vessels, and attempt to identify the MJK surveillance.  
To accomplish their given mission, the surveillance teams were required to conduct 
complex, coordinated movements through varied terrain using multiple modes of 
transportation. The complexity of the operation emphasized constant communication, both 
within and between the teams, to continuously react to the targeted individual’s actions. In 
the scenario, the operators were not under threat of direct enemy contact, but the mission’s 
success hinged on their ability to maintain visual contact without being identified by the 
target, raising suspicion from bystanders, or piquing the interest of the scenario’s law 
enforcement or intelligence services.  
4. Actions 
As the surveillance teams moved throughout the operational area, the Control Team 
moved to keep the nodes within the mesh network. For the first half of the experiment, 
rather than trying to pinpoint the surveillance team, launch a threat drone, and have the 
MJK C2 element detect the drone, the Control Team opted to use the Dowding Server’s 
simulator function to convey the threat of SUAS to the operators. These simulated 
detections looked nearly identical to the operator when using the Dowding App.  
During the second half of the experiment, the Threat UAS pilots launched both 
Mavic Pro Platinum and Mavic Enterprise drones to detect potential surveillance teams 
along the main roadway and to identify the MJK C2 element’s vessel.  
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5. Observations 
Throughout Phase 4, network connectivity limited the surveillance teams’ ability 
to use the Dowding App. Because of the small number of network nodes and the vast size 
and dense terrain of the training area, surveillance teams regularly fell out of connectivity 
with the network. As such, the operators spent much of the exercise without connectivity 
to the Dowding Server. The network nodes located with the MJK C2 element were the only 
nodes that consistently connected to the MANET, and thus, the Dowding Server. 
(1) COP Appearance 
The COP functioned and presented consistently with the observations of Phase 3. 
The operators noted the simple, easy to read appearance of the Dowding App’s interface 
and remarked on the simplicity of the drone and GCS iconology, as well as the utility of 
the tracks.  
(2) Alerts 
During this phase, the Dowding App’s alert function was crucial, as operators were 
balancing their surveillance and mobility tasks with the use of their SA tool. Operators 
remarked on the speed at which the alerts were presented, as well as the multi-pronged 
approach (physical, audio, and visual alerts), which indicated the need to quickly reference 
their SA tool to locate the threat UAS. These alerts were especially useful, given the 
connectivity difficulties of the over-stretched mesh network. The operators noted that they 
did not regularly look at the Dowding App, because their devices were not consistently 
connected to the server. The alert function provided not only an alert that a drone was 
present, but that their device was back to full functionality.  
(3) Latency  
The MJK C2 element noted near real-time COP updates, similar to those seen in 
previous phases of experimentation. Though connectivity issues limited the opportunities 
for the surveillance teams to observe delays in the COP, they remarked that the icons 
accurately displayed the locations of the drones and that the COP regularly updated with 
the movement of the aircraft. 
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(4) Indexing the Threat 
Operators in Phase 4 were less concerned with enemy UAS as a direct threat to the 
safety of their unit, but rather as an indicator of enemy counter-surveillance. As such, they 
rarely needed to quickly identify a drone’s position in the air, but rather required the drone’s 
location relative to their location or the location of a landmark on the ground. During a 
surveillance leg, one operator was able to quickly identify a drone in the air by using 
Dowding’s radar-interface. The operators noted the potential utility of the Dowding App’s 
radar interface and augmented reality function, but did not regularly use these features, due 
to the nature of the mission and the lack of consistent connectivity.  
(5) Overall Assessment 
During this phase, operators noted the limitations of the Dowding App as a broad 
use situational awareness tool. Unlike Phase 3, where the primary intra-team 
communication methods were tactical radio, voice, and hand and arm signals, operators 
during Phase 4 required the use of low-visibility communications technologies like 
messaging applications, file sharing, and voice chat-rooms. To ensure each of these 
technologies functioned properly, the operators used a separate device for the Dowding 
App and their organic systems. As such, the operators were often fumbling with multiple 
devices to maintain situational awareness throughout the operation. 
Additionally, the operators remarked on the rigidity of the Dowding App, noting 
the inability to easily tailor the alert types, notification settings, and appearance of the 
displayed icons. The operators observed instances where drone icons populated in areas 
outside of their direct influence and were unable to filter those detections from within the 
app itself. Overall the operators, in this phase, found the Dowding App’s alert function 
helpful but found its utility as an overall situational awareness tool to be lacking. 
6. SkyView. 
While not a specific experiment objective, we observed and tested several aspects 
of the performance of the SkyView sensor. During this phase, the SkyView sensor was 
located on the MJK C2 vessel and connected to the MANET using an MPU5 radio. 
73 
SkyView stopped making consistent detections when traveling ~30 knots. When the boat 
slowed below that speed, the SkyView again began reliably detecting drones. We tested 
the detection distance by piloting the boat away from an active drone. At 2.3 KM, the 
SkyView no longer consistently detected the drone. This distance covered was over open 
water and was measured as a straight-line using the ATAK’s measurement tool. Figure 23 
depicts the SkyView range test. 
 
Figure 23. SkyView Detection at 23 KM on ATAK 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The results of the experimentations fell into two primary categories: capabilities 
and limitations of the tested tools and utility of the situational awareness tools. While the 
observations from Phases 1 and 2 are foundational to the overall experiment and useful to 
furthering comprehension of the state of C-UAS technologies, the data collected from 
Phases 3 and 4 provides critical answers to research questions. Our research shows that 
tactical SA tools enhance decision making and survivability of SOF teams by providing 
operators real-time location data for threat SUAS from networked C-UAS sensors. The 
following sections illustrate the key C-UAS functions an SA tool must maintain to best 
support a deployed SOF team. 
A. C-UAS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS TOOL REQUIREMENTS 
The ATAK and Dowding App, used in conjunction with the SkyView sensor during 
Phases 3 and 4, provided the operators with real-time SUAS information presented on 
graphic user interfaces. By observing the team’s actions and comments, we were able to 
determine the factors of each interface that positively and negatively impacted the team’s 
situational awareness and decision making. While the selected SA tools provide operators 
with similar information regarding the detection of SUAS, we observed several differences 
that contributed to their ability to make fast, correct decisions without being overwhelmed 
by the COP or distracted from their tasks.  
When conducting an operation under the threat of enemy SUAS, many factors 
contribute to timely and accurate decision making. During experimentation, we observed 
four factors critical to a useful SA tool for SOF operators in a tactical environment: a 
deliberate alert feature, the app’s ability to quickly orient the operator to a SUAS threat, 
flexibility during the conduct of various tasks, and stability of the application itself. While 
several other factors were identified as significant, these four were consistently recognized 
as crucial by both observers and the operators themselves. 
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1. Automated Alerts 
This factor refers to the ability to alert the operator to an impending SUAS threat 
without the operator looking at the device itself. According to many of the operators, this 
was the most crucial capability for any SA tool, because it enabled them to focus on their 
required tasks, rather than their SA tool. 
Unlike commanding an operation from a Joint or Tactical Operations Center (JOC 
or TOC), deployed operators must focus on the ongoing task, not on a digital COP 
presented by an SA tool. As such, an automatic warning function is crucial for operators to 
maintain situational awareness while conducting complex and challenging mission. The 
Dowding App’s audible warning, haptic vibration, and visual alert window allow operators 
to focus on the task, and refer to the COP only when notified of a SUAS threat.  
The criticality of alerts was most apparent during Phase 3C (direct-action raid) and 
Phase 4 (low-visibility, special reconnaissance). During Phase 3C, the operators were 
unable to monitor their SA devices at regular intervals due to the fast pace of the operation, 
the rapidly changing tactical situation, and the threat of direct enemy contact. While 
conducting their maritime and land-based special reconnaissance mission in Phase 4, 
operators became engrossed with the more technical requirements of the operation. During 
this phase, operators were unable to consistently monitor their COP as they synchronized 
their movements to maintain visual custody of their reconnaissance objective.  
The Dowding App’s automatic alerts helped the operators in both phases to 
maintain SA of SUAS throughout the operation by alerting them to the threat and allowing 
them to reference the COP during tactically feasible periods in the mission. Without these 
alerts, the operators would not have been aware of the SUAS threats until they reached a 
tactical pause in the operation. As such, they would have made decisions using incomplete 
information, and may have made tactically unsound choices concerning force protection 
and accomplishment of their mission. The tactical scenarios and missions during Phases 
3C and 4 were selected in order to assess SA tool utility across a spectrum of operations. 
Both experiments underscore the importance of maintaining SA without unnecessarily 
drawing the operator’s attention from their operational requirements. 
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2. Indexing the Threat 
The second critical factor is the COP’s ability to identify a SUAS threat and enable 
the operator to rapidly orient on the location of the aircraft itself. This factor incorporates 
the features of the tool that affect the efficient nature in which operators receive the 
information. 
The Dowding App’s interface enables the user to see the location of the drone on 
the map and provides real-time distance and direction using the self-orienting radar-
graphic. It does this without cluttering the COP with unnecessary information or requiring 
additional user input (such as clicking the threat icon). The ATAK only provides operators 
with the location of a detected SUAS by presenting the icon on the COP. Operators were 
able to determine the distance and direction by using the native “distance/direction” 
function, but this required several user inputs and was unwieldy in the rapidly evolving 
situation. 
While the Dowding App’s augmented reality (AR) feature did not function as 
seamlessly as expected, a more refined version of this feature could assist users in 
identifying the exact location of detected SUAS, but would likely not be especially useful 
during most SOF missions. In its current form, the AR function requires the user to remove 
his SA tool device from its mount, use both hands to stabilize the platform, and focus 
exclusively on the device to locate the threat UAS. This capability could prove more useful 
if incorporated into a heads-up display. 
3. Application Flexibility 
This factor refers to the ability to use a given application as the primary SA tool 
when conducting various mission sets and the operator’s ability to easily tailor the 
application to his individual needs. While our experiment focused on the C-UAS utility of 
a SA tool, the broad applicability of the tool is just as important.  
Operators remarked on the limited capabilities that the Dowding System brought to 
the fight. The Dowding App’s C-UAS functionality exceeds those of the ATAK, however, 
the inability to manipulate the COP and communicate between users, limits its utility as a 
primary SA platform. 
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Conversely, though the ATAK features a robust menu of applications that makes it 
a useful platform as a versatile tool, its native C-UAS functionality is not sufficiently 
refined to serve as the primary C-UAS COP for SOF units. The TAK platform’s ability to 
host numerous plug-ins adds to the flexibility of the ATAK and could enhance its C-UAS 
capabilities.  
Like the missions they conduct, SOF units and individual operators have unique 
requirements for mission command and SA tools. While useful as a C-UAS tool, the 
Dowding App is not sufficiently adaptable to meet the broader needs of the modern SOF 
operator. During testing, operators commented on the need to quickly change several GUI 
factors, including alert settings (different audio and visual cues), detection rings (geo-
fences), icon filters, drone naming conventions, and the size and appearance of icons. 
Though some of these changes are possible at the server-level or by using the web UI, none 
are currently features of the Android app. The ability to quickly make these changes within 
the app would allow the operator to customize the interface to individual preference and 
rapidly changing environments. 
The ATAK retains much of the functionality sought by the operators during testing; 
the settings and functions within the ATAK application allow the operators to manually set 
geofences, filter icons, and to change the name and appearance of icons.115 While the 
Dowding App functions as an Android-optimized view of the central Dowding Server, the 
ATAK application is capable of operating without a centralized server. This setup enables 
operators to easily manipulate the information presented on their device. 
4. App Stability 
This factor focuses on a tool’s ability to consistently function in an austere 
environment or when network connectivity is intermittent or degraded. Stability is a critical 
                                                 
115 Though these functions are all possible using the standard ATAK application, most of these 
functions either were not used or did work properly during the testing. Operators did not establish or 
change geofences and they did not purposely filter icons. During Phase 3A, the operators were able to 
manually change the icon appearance of the detected drones, but the drones quickly reverted to their 
original appearance due to the nature of the SkyView data. 
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requirement to SOF units, as unreliable equipment poses too great a risk to operators in 
high-threat environments. 
The operators remarked on the instability of the Dowding App and its inability to 
maintain a consistent connection to the server. The high latency, intermittent network made 
it difficult to rely on the Dowding App when conducting high-risk, special operations. 
During this test, the ATAK remained stable and, although it is not as fast or precise as the 
Dowding System, was nearly always available.  
B. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF EQUIPMENT 
This section discusses the capabilities and limitations of the equipment used during 
the experiment. 
1. Tactical MANET 
During Phase 4, the radios used to establish our tactical MANET limited our ability 
to comprehensively test the utility of the selected SA tools. With only five working radios, 
our ability to stretch the MANET and keep all nodes and devices within the network 
“bubble” was extremely limited. This number of nodes proved insufficient to maintain 
connectivity due to the expansive size, undulating terrain, and dense vegetation of the 
operational area.  
The capabilities of the radios themselves proved to be adequate for the technical 
requirements imposed on them. The bandwidth of both the MPU4 and MPU5 radios was 
sufficient to sustain the simultaneous data traffic from the Dowding Server, the SkyView 
sensor, and the ATAK apps. This observation further validates the use of these radios as a 
data conduit for this type of sensor integration.  
2. SkyView 
As discussed in previous chapters, the SkyView system is a library-based, RF 
sensor. While we observed consistent detections to distances as far as 2.3 KM using the 
SkyView, the sensor is only capable of detecting SUAS pre-programmed into its database. 
While we controlled for this variable by using only threat drones contained in the SkyView 
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library during Phases 3 and 4 of experimentation, several SUAS went undetected during 
preliminary tests. This observation further validates the need for SOF units to maintain a 
multi-sensor, layered C-UAS capability, as threat UAS not contained in an RF sensor’s 
library will go undetected. 
The unique capability of the SkyView is its portability. The model of SkyView 
tested was designed to receive power from automotive 12V auxiliary outlets, Type B 120V 
prime power, or various portable military batteries. During field testing, the SkyView was 
powered by a rechargeable, Persistent Systems battery, allowing an operator to carry the 
sensor in a backpack throughout the operation. This portability, in conjunction with a 
robust closed tactical MANET and SA tools, enable the SOF unit to maintain a self-
contained SUAS detection capability.  
In an environment with denied communications, this capability enhances the small 
unit leader’s ability to exercise mission command, by increasing situational awareness 
without the resources of his higher headquarters. While we tested the capability of our 
SUAS detection system on a closed MANET in small-scale experiments during Phase 2, 
the Dowding System did not perform consistently enough without internet access to 
evaluate this network configuration during our limited field-testing window. Though our 
experimental setup using the Dowding Server in conjunction with the SkyView sensor 
serves as a potential model for a man-portable, closed network C-UAS system, we were 
unable to fully validate this capability. 
Operating a man-portable SUAS detection system on a completely closed MANET 
comes at a cost. Our research found that the only man-portable SUAS sensors currently 
available are those that rely on RF detection. As previously discussed, relying exclusively 
on RF sensors places significant risk on the operators by allowing SUAS whose signals are 
not codified in the sensor’s load set to go undetected. This conundrum requires leaders of 
small, separated teams to balance the detection requirements with the requirement to 
maintain a diminished electronic signature. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Our research and experimentation identified the necessary factors for a situational 
awareness tool to be effective for SOF operators in an environment where the threat of 
enemy SUAS is likely. Using these four critical factors as a foundation, we identified 
several additional steps that, if implemented, will significantly enhance the mission 
command and protection capabilities of these SOF units. Finally, our experiment highlights 
the need for additional research and testing to better integrate C-UAS technology with 
situational awareness tools. 
A. THE FUTURE OF C-UAS AND SA TOOLS: 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the key factors for a C-UAS SA tool are a 
purposeful alert, an ability to quickly convey the spatial position of a threat, the tool’s 
utility when used during different missions, and stability of the platform. By leveraging 
these factors to drive future development, USSOCOM and the Department of Defense can 
maximize the effectiveness of SA tools and better prepare SOF leaders for current and 
future battlefields. This can be accomplished by implementing the following initiatives: 
1. Dowding ATAK Plugin  
To make ATAK more effective in combatting SUAS threats, the system must be 
optimized to receive and display the appropriate information. A Dowding plug-in for the 
ATAK solves the identified problems of the Dowding App’s instability and single-mission 
focus by embedding its capabilities within the stable and diverse TAK environment. 
Simultaneously, the plug-in would bring nuanced C-UAS capabilities to the ATAK 
application, bolstering ATAK’s utility on the current and future battlefields. This plug-in 
should incorporate the Dowding App’s radar-interface, multi-dimensional alerts, and 
historical data. Creating a Dowding-based ATAK plug-in would provide the operator with 
the most useful aspects of both applications and maximize the critical factors outlined in 
Chapter IV. 
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2. Further Sensor Integration 
The current set of SUAS sensors integrated into the Dowding Server is primarily 
comprised of RF sensors. Future efforts should focus on incorporating radar and acoustic 
sensors into the system to ensure SOF units can utilize their entire arsenal of detection 
capabilities.  
3. Multi-Sensor Fusion  
With the incorporation of additional sensor ingest protocols, any C-UAS plug-in, 
Dowding-based or otherwise, must include intelligent software capable of aggregating and 
filtering data to provide the user with the most critical information. This synthesis is 
necessary to ensure information is clearly displayed to the user and to avoid multiple 
reports of the same aircraft, as seen in previous research. 
4. Optimize for the Individual Operator  
Any C-UAS plug-in for the ATAK should be user-tailorable to the individual 
operator within the application itself. Users should be able to adjust geo-fences, alert 
settings, and icon appearance from the plug-in interface using an intuitive option menu. 
This capability broadens the applicability of the plug-in by allowing users to modify their 
interface based on individual preference or mission requirements. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH  
While the results from our experimentation provided insight into the requirements 
of SA tools for SOF operators in a C-UAS environment, there is still much work to be done 
to counter the threat of LSS UAS. Several factors limited our research, including the 
developmental nature of the tested tools, the limitations of our equipment, and the scope 
of our research topic. Future research and testing should focus on the following research 
areas: 
1. More Rigorous Testing  
To further investigate the potential utility of an integrated C-UAS/SA tool system, 
the app/plug-in should be tested by various SOF organizations in more demanding and 
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diverse situations. This testing should include multi-day exercises in austere environments 
and incorporate airborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations to more accurately 
simulate SOF missions.  
2. Closed Tactical MANET 
Additional testing should be conducted relying on a robust, tactical MANET 
without an internet gateway. Our testing included several bench tests to test this capability, 
but future field testing should seek to investigate the feasibility of a completely closed 
tactical MANET as the primary network architecture for a SOF team’s C-UAS capabilities.  
3. Expand the MANET 
In addition to testing a closed tactical MANET, future testing should incorporate 
long-range, bursty radios into the MANET. Using long-range capabilities, like the 
GoTenna Pro, could enable dismounted SOF units to incorporate non-portable sensors, 
such as radars, into their SUAS detection plan. This would allow operators to rely on more 
than just RF detection, when operating as a dismounted force. 
4. SUAS Defeat 
While our research focused on the C-UAS aspect of SOF missions, the scope of our 
testing did not include any defeat capabilities required to truly protect SOF units from a 
SUAS threat. Future testing should seek to integrate both detect and defeat technologies 
into the TAK environment to develop and evaluate a comprehensive C-UAS platform. 
Exploring the integration of these capabilities will further enable SOF leaders to protect 
their units by providing additional capabilities to deal with SUAS. 
5. SUAS Swarms 
Though our experimental setup was tested against as many as three live drones 
simultaneously, we did not explore situations including swarms of drones. Considering the 
emerging threat of autonomous swarm technologies, future research might address such 
possible scenarios. 
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6. Unite Disparate Efforts 
If our team learned one thing from our initial research for this experiment, it is that 
the Department of Defense has countless C-UAS efforts moving simultaneously. While 
some of these efforts are novel approaches to the LSS UAS problem, many are redundant. 
Much of this duplicative effort is due to an ignorance of the available technologies and a 
lack of communication between the organizations that develop them. To reduce the 
unnecessary resourcing of these technologies, future research should seek to combine the 
efforts of these disparate projects and incorporate interested parties from across DoD and 
industry. By uniting these efforts into a more cohesive C-UAS campaign plan, future 
projects can better support SOF forces in the current battlespace and beyond. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
This section discusses how the design of the experiment influenced the results and 
potentially limited the value of these observations. Our experiment was conducted by a 
single SOF unit (Norway’s MJK), executing three mission sets through one to six-hour 
iterations. While the operation in Phase 4 was relatively complex, the missions conducted 
in Phase 3 were very simple. The operational complexity was further limited by the size 
and range of our tactical MANET. As such, the tests did not encapsulate the breadth of 
SOF missions or the diversity of SOF units. 
1. MANET 
As previously mentioned, the number of radios contributed significantly to our 
connectivity throughout Phase 4 of the operation. Because of this, operators during this 
phase only had intermittent communication capabilities and were unable to reliably use the 
SA tools, which limited our observations. Additional radios would have enabled us to build 
a more extensive tactical MANET for testing. A more robust network would have enabled 
the operators to more easily use their SA tools throughout their operation and provide better 
data for analysis.  
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2. C-UAS Sensors  
Though we initially sought to incorporate several sensors into the experimental 
design, we were only able to obtain and evaluate the SkyView. Therefore, we cannot 
generalize our findings without further testing. Integrating additional sensors into the 
experiment would have allowed us to examine the utility of a more robustly populated cop, 
and assess key aspects of data feeds from different sensors. As previously discussed, a 
comprehensive, multi-sensor battery of C-UAS capabilities is required to best protect 
military forces from threat UAS.  
3. Time  
The final two phases of the experiment consisted of roughly three days of testing 
and observation. While we designed the experiment to incorporate three different special 
operations missions (static reconnaissance, direct-action raid, and special reconnaissance) 
across diverse terrain, the available experiment window limited our ability to examine the 
SA tool utility in other scenarios. This also prevented more iterative testing of the 
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APPENDIX. EQUIPMENT AND NETWORK INVENTORY 
C-UAS and Network Items 






Commercial off the 











End User Device 
(EDU) used by 
operators to access 
ATAK and 
Dowding. 
Dowding Server None 
 
System created by 











Man Portable Unit 
GEN4 (MPU4) 
  
MANET radio used 
to communicate via 
data and voice. 




MANET radio used 
to communicate via 
data and voice. 
Dowding
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C-UAS and Network Items 
NAME PICTURE SYMBOL PURPOSE 




with Raspberry Pi 











C-UAS sensor that 
uses radio 
frequency (RF) 
detection to identify 

















Other Network Symbols 
NAME SYMBOL PURPOSE 
Connections 
 
Colors represent the type of 
connection. Black is any 
hardwired connection cable 
other than CAT5e. Green is 
CAT5e Ethernet cable. Blue is 
a wireless connection. 
Mobile Ad Hoc 
Network (MANET) 
 
System of wirelessly linked 




Laptop symbol represents any 
other computer used by the 
team. The world symbolizes 
connection to the world wide 
web. The world symbol was 
replaced with a word to 
identify any other functions 
(i.e., WinTAK computer). 
Operator 
 
Operator refers to either a 
dismounted or mobile (car, 
ATV) SOF member. 
MJK Vessel 
 
A civilian ship modified for 
SOF command and control. 
MJK Van 
 
A civilian van modified for 
SOF command and control. 
Operations Center 
  
A centralized node of people 
and equipment that enables 
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